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ABSTRACT 
Recognition judgments, such as those involved in eyewitness identification, are often 
depicted as relatively pure products of memory processes and criterion setting, such as is 
depicted in the WITNESS model of eyewitness identification behavior. The presence of 
extra-memorial factors, such as social influence, however, necessitates a negotiation between 
memorial and extra-memorial information. Participants (N = 450) viewed a short video 
depicting a person planting a bomb down an airshaft. Before attempting lineup 
identifications, participants in Experiment 1 learned that an alleged co-witness made a ―not 
there,‖ plausible, or implausible identification decision with high or low confidence. Co-
witness information dramatically influenced identification decisions in the direction of the 
co-witness‘s decision. Particularly important was the finding that there was a significant 
effect of co-witness information even for participants who learned that the co-witness 
identified an implausible lineup member. This latter finding cannot be explained by standard 
two-parameter models of recognition (such as the WITNESS model). Participants‘ 
confidence in their identification decisions tended to match that of their co-witness, 
regardless of whether the co-witness gave a ―not there,‖ plausible, or implausible 
identification decision. However, this confidence-matching effect was greater for participants 
who made the same decision as the co-witness than it was for participants who made a 
different decision than the co-witness. Experiment 2 participants (N=323) viewed the same 
crime video and then either viewed the lineup first or received the co-witness information 
(i.e., a ―not there‖ or plausible identification decision) first. As in Experiment 1, co-witness 
information influenced identification decisions in the direction of the co-witness‘s 
identification, but the extent of the influence did not vary as a function of the presentation 
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order of a lineup and co-witness information. When asked later how they would have 
responded if they had never received  the co-witness information, participants were able to 
somewhat correctly imagine the identification decision they would have made without the 
co-witness information, but this correction always underestimated the co-witness‘s influence. 
The results suggest a need for a third parameter, in addition to memory strength and decision 
criteria, when attempting to predict and explain eyewitness identification behavior in a real-
world setting.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
My family and I were in Boston‘s North End, waiting for my cousin to pick us up in 
his car. After a short while, my aunt recognized his car, and the rest of us who were 
waiting followed her straight to the car. Meanwhile, the driver in the car behind the 
one we were about to enter started honking the horn obnoxiously, so we all jumped 
into the car as quickly as we could. Suddenly, my aunt, who had gotten in the front 
seat, noticed that it was not her son that was driving the car, but rather a middle-aged 
woman and her dog who were both exceedingly frightened because three strangers 
had jumped into her car. One by one we realized that we were in the wrong car and 
bolted out of the poor woman‘s car. We soon discovered that the driver of the car 
who was honking obnoxiously behind us was really my cousin, trying to alert us that 
the car that we thought we recognized as his was not. – True story from the author 
 
Every day, people make countless recognition judgments, often without any 
conscious effort. Do you know the person who is approaching you and, if so, from where? 
Which purse or briefcase is yours? Is the car you are about to get into your relative‘s or a 
stranger‘s? How people make recognition decisions is often considered to arise from an 
assessment of two variables: how well the stimulus matches the memory of the object, and 
how well the stimulus must match the memory before a person will decide that he or she 
recognizes it, which is known as the decision criterion (Clark, 2003, 2005; Clark and 
Gronlund, 1996; Green & Swets, 1966; Haberlandt, 1997; McNicol, 1972).  
The decision criterion a person sets for recognizing something may shift due to extra-
memorial variables, such as context, social influences, and prior knowledge. For example, 
my aunt, who should have known what her son‘s car looked like, was the person who first 
mistakenly identified the middle-aged woman‘s car as her son‘s car. When she started 
walking towards the incorrect car, the rest of us did not pay much attention to how well the 
car matched our memory, and we blindly followed her. If any one of us had tried to 
recognize the car on our own, we would have had a higher criterion for deciding whether or 
not we recognized it and, therefore, verified our decision to enter the car by looking at the 
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driver before opening the door. Our erroneous decisions were a direct result of taking into 
account both memorial cues—our weak memories for the car—and extra-memorial cues—
our aunt‘s decision to walk towards the car. It is each individual‘s combination of memorial 
and extra-memorial cues that bring about the recognition memory judgments that they make 
each and every day.  
At times, memorial and extra-memorial information might be contradictory, and some 
uncertainty may arise about what pieces of information are correct. Signal detection theory 
takes into account this notion of uncertainty in reasoning and decision making when setting a 
decision criterion for recognizing an object (Green & Swets, 1966; Haberlandt, 1997; 
McNicol, 1972). Signal detection theory takes into consideration that when determining 
whether or not a target is present, there are typically four possible outcomes: a hit, a correct 
rejection, a miss, or a false alarm. The first two are correct decisions, but the second two are 
incorrect decisions. According to signal detection theory, the decision criterion that a person 
sets for detecting the target stimulus is based on a payoff matrix with specific weight given to 
each of the four outcomes.  
How costly a false alarm is as opposed to a miss and how beneficial a hit is as 
opposed to a correct rejection are factors that determine the point at which a person makes a 
decision to detect a signal. For example, in a social situation, it is typically more costly to ask 
someone about her pregnancy and be incorrect (i.e., false alarm) than to not comment on the 
pregnancy at all (i.e., miss). A situation in which the relative weights of false alarms and 
misses are less clear is with eyewitnesses who have to determine whether it is more costly to 
mistakenly identify someone in a lineup as the perpetrator of a crime or to miss the 
perpetrator in a lineup entirely. Additionally, an eyewitness typically can identify one of six 
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people in a lineup, say that the perpetrator of the crime is not in the lineup or say that he or 
she does not know whether or not the perpetrator is in the lineup. The decision making 
process with lineups is more complex than saying that the perpetrator is present in the lineup 
or that he is not. Eyewitnesses must decide which person in the lineup, if any, is who they 
saw commit the crime. 
The WITNESS model is a mathematical model designed to mimic how eyewitnesses 
decide to either make an identification or reject the lineup and how they decide which lineup 
member to identify as the culprit (Clark, 2003, 2005). The model is an example of global 
matching models, which take into account two parameters: how well a target item matches a 
person‘s memory for the item and the decision criterion a person sets for making a 
determination of whether or not the target item has been seen before (Clark & Gronlund, 
1996). The identification decision rule in the WITNESS model is based on a weighted sum of 
two different judgments (Clark). One judgment is an assessment of the extent to which the 
best match in the lineup corresponds with the eyewitness‘s memory of the perpetrator. The 
other judgment is an assessment of the difference between the best and next-best match. If 
the sum of these two weighted measures is above the eyewitness‘s identification decision 
criterion, then the eyewitness will identify the best-match as the perpetrator of the crime. 
Therefore, an identification will be made if either the match is very high or if the best-next 
difference is high. Under the parameters of the WITNESS model, an eyewitness will say that 
the perpetrator is not in the lineup if the match value of all of the lineup members is under the 
eyewitness‘s rejection decision criterion. Additionally, an eyewitness will say that he or she 
does not know whether the perpetrator is in the lineup if the weighted sum of the best match 
plus the difference between the best and next-best match is not above the identification 
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decision criteria and if the individual lineup members are not all below the rejection decision 
criteria. Even though the WITNESS model and other direct-access matching models can 
explain whether somebody will choose to make a positive identification or reject the lineup, 
they cannot explain how an eyewitness might shift from one positive identification decision 
(e.g., identifying lineup member #5) to another (e.g., identifying lineup member #3) based on 
external social influences.  
The current research is particularly focused on the question of if and when an 
eyewitness will make an identification of someone who is not the best match to the witness‘s 
memory of the perpetrator. Although it may seem counter-intuitive that an eyewitness would 
make a positive identification of someone other than the person who most resembles the 
perpetrator, imagine the following scenarios: If a person thought that number five in a lineup 
was the culprit based on his or her memory but also learned that there were reasons to believe 
that the culprit was number three, what would he or she do? What if number three was 
similar in appearance to number five? What if number three looked nothing like number 
five? What if the person acquired the extra-memorial information before he or she had a 
chance to study the lineup? What if the extra-memorial information came only after the 
person had already studied the lineup?  
If there are multiple eyewitnesses to a crime and Eyewitness A learns of Eyewitness 
B‘s identification decision, will Eyewitness A always rely on his or her memory for the 
perpetrator or will information about Eyewitness B‘s decision influence Eyewitness A‘s 
identification decision? It is believed that how a witness will use extra-memorial information 
provided by a co-witness will depend in part on how likely the witness thinks it is that the co-
witness is correct. In determining how much influence to allow a co-witness to have on a 
5 
 
recognition decision, it is assumed that the witness will take into account how good his or her 
own memory is for the event, how good he or she thinks the co-witness‘s memory is for the 
event, and how plausible the co-witness‘s recognition judgment is. These three factors are 
likely to play a role in a witness‘s identification decisions, given that the witness has an 
overriding goal of being correct. 
In the current research, social influence effects that merely shift an eyewitness from 
making no identification to making an identification (or vice versa) can readily be handled 
with the WITNESS model and other models that posit the two parameters of signal 
strength—what the WITNESS model calls match—and decision criterion. However, any 
evidence that social influence can shift an eyewitness from selecting one lineup member to 
selecting a different lineup member cannot be accounted for by these two-parameter models. 
Accordingly, if effects such as these are found, the current research has the potential to force 
revisions of these types of models so that they can account for identification decision shifts 
that are neither the product of the match parameter nor the decision-criterion parameter.  
Why Do People Use Extra-Memorial Information When Making Decisions? 
One of the main assumptions made by social cognitive researchers is that an 
important, driving motive for humans is the motive to be accurate (Aronson, Wilson, & 
Akert, 2005; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Because 
this is a powerful social motive, which probably had survival value, people are less 
concerned with keeping various informational input domains separate (e.g., using only 
memory or only external information) and instead use and combine whatever information 
they have to make an accurate judgment. In fact, people are likely to seek out extra-memorial 
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information, especially when a situation or decision is ambiguous, such as whether or not the 
perpetrator of a crime is in a lineup and, if he is, which person in the lineup is the perpetrator.  
Another main assumption made by social cognitive researchers is that humans are 
motivated to maintain high self-esteem and present a favorable image of themselves to others 
(Aronson, 1992; 1998; Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005; Baumeister, 1993; Harter, 1993; 
Kunda, 1990; Pyszczynski, Solomon, Greenberg, & Stewart-Fouts, 1995; Stone, 1998; 
Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992; Tice, 1993). This motive leads people to examine features in 
the environment that would cast them in a positive light to those around them. This may 
entail justifying past behavior by bringing thoughts and actions in line with an outward 
judgment or decision (Festinger, 1954; 1957; Festinger & Aronson, 1960; Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959) or bringing information that has been given to them about something that 
they may or may not have seen before and incorporating it into their memories (Ayers & 
Reder, 1998; Davis & Loftus, 2007; Loftus, 1975; 1991; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978; 
Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001; Wright & Loftus, 1998). Because the motives to 
maintain high self-esteem and present a favorable image to others are inextricable from 
human action, any recognition judgment must be examined not only in terms of a comparison 
of a stimulus to a person‘s memory of the target, but also in terms of extra-memorial factors 
that might be available to the person (Clark, 2003, 2005). 
Except in rare, contrived circumstances, such as when a person is in a psychology 
laboratory or taking a test, recognition decisions occur within a social milieu. As previously 
mentioned, humans have the need to be correct and to appear competent to others. Therefore, 
if there is extra-memorial information available, a person making a decision will take this 
information into account when attempting to arrive at the correct decision. This is true for 
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decisions ranging from deciding whether or not to identify a person from a lineup to which 
car to get into when being picked up on a crowded street, and it is especially true when 
people are highly motivated to be correct (Baron, Vandello, & Brunsman, 1996; Levine, 
Higgins, & Choi, 2000). 
Eyewitnesses Use Extra-Memorial Information When Making Identification Decisions 
An eyewitness identification situation is a particularly good dynamic in which to 
study the negotiation between memorial and extra-memorial information (Clark, 2003, 
2005). This is because an eyewitness recognition judgment is a very consequential decision 
made in the real world in which a person is typically motivated to be accurate and will try to 
take in as much information as possible before making the judgment. The DNA exoneration 
cases underscore the dramatic impact that extra-memorial information can have on 
recognition memory judgments. One thing that stands out when examining the DNA 
exoneration cases that involved eyewitness identifications is that the mistaken identifications 
often do not tend to look like recognition memory errors in any pure sense.  
For example, Anthony Michael Green was wrongfully convicted of rape and 
aggravated robbery. He spent 13 years in jail before DNA evidence exonerated him. Green‘s 
photograph can be seen on the left-hand panel in Figure 1. After Green‘s release, the true 
identity of the perpetrator was determined. A photograph of the perpetrator, Rodney Rhines, 
that was taken near the time of the assault can be found on the right-hand panel in Figure 1. 
Amazingly Green and Rhines look almost nothing alike, yet the victim-witness mistakenly 
identified Green as her rapist (Green v. City of Cleveland, 2001).  
Another example of this phenomenon was displayed in Newsome v. City of Chicago 
(2003). The photograph displayed in the top panel of Figure 2 is of Dennis Emerson, the man 
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Figure 1. The photograph on the left is of Anthony Michael Green, a teenager who was 
mistakenly identified by an eyewitness who was raped and robbed by Rodney Rhines, the 
person in the photograph on the right. 
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who robbed a convenience store and brutally murdered the store clerk. The lineup that police 
showed to the three eyewitnesses of the murder is in the lower two panels of Figure 2. James 
Newsome, the man who is #3 in the lineup, was mistakenly identified by all three 
eyewitnesses as the perpetrator of the crime. Analyses have shown that there was only a 1 in 
37,037 chance that all three eyewitnesses would have ―naturally‖ (i.e., based on similarity 
alone) identified James Newsome as resembling the perpetrator. In the Discussion section of 
Experiment 1, I will describe the social influence that was operating on the three witnesses 
who mistakenly identified Newsome. 
It is obvious in cases such as these that the eyewitness‘s identification decision cannot 
be purely based on memorial information, but instead also rests heavily on some external, 
extra-memorial influence. Additionally, oftentimes the eyewitnesses in DNA exoneration 
cases express being quite uncertain of their identifications at first, but during trial express 
very high confidence in the identification. For example, the victim-witness who mistakenly 
identified Charles Huchting as her rapist spent about 30 minutes viewing a lineup, hemming 
and hawing about whether or not the features of each of the men in the lineup matched her 
memory of the perpetrator at all. After this half-hour she stated, ―Number Two that‘s him.‖ 
At trial, however, she stated that she was ―one hundred percent sure‖ of her identification 
(Missouri v. Huchting, 1996). When an identification of an innocent person is made under 
conditions such as these, it becomes exceedingly clear that eyewitness reports often 
demonstrate a negotiation between memorial and extra-memorial, in these cases social, 
pieces of information.  
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Figure 2. The top photograph is of Dennis Emerson, a man who murdered a convenience 
store clerk. Below are photographs of the lineup from which James Newsome (lineup 
member #3) was mistakenly identified as the perpetrator of the crime. 
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Conformity and Internalization 
As has been shown in classic social psychological experiments, it is not difficult to 
induce individuals to comply under some form of social pressure (Asch, 1951; 1955; 1956;  
1957; Blass, 1999; Bond & Smith, 1996; Milgram, 1963; 1974). In fact, a correct minority 
can be easily induced to conform to an incorrect majority (Asch, 1951; 1955; 1956; 1957). 
Many times people conform because of the underlying motive to present a favorable image 
of themselves to others. However, the current research does not seek to examine conformity 
to social pressure that is exuded by an authority or by one‘s peers, but rather it seeks to 
examine the process by which an eyewitness comes to accept and internalize the opinion of 
another as his or her own.  
Acceptance, or internalization, is found most often when the correct answer to a 
question is ambiguous (Cialdini, 2000; Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955; MacNeil & Sherif, 1976; Sherif, 1936). In situations in which the correct judgment is 
not obvious, people look to other cues, especially social ones, in order to determine the 
correct answer. If peoples‘ beliefs about a stimulus do not agree with others‘ beliefs about the 
stimulus, they often reinterpret the stimulus to accommodate others‘ beliefs (Allen & Wilder, 
1980). Instead of merely parroting the judgment of others, in some situations, people accept 
or internalize what others have said as the truth and believe it to be the correct answer 
(Sherif, 1936). It may be that when internalization occurs it affects memorial representations 
of the recognition object. Humans have a need for consistency and that this need pervades 
human thinking (Festinger, 1954; 1957; Festinger & Aronson, 1960; Festinger & Carlsmith, 
1959). Therefore, once a judgment has been made explicitly, whether it is based on a 
person‘s memory alone or on the deduction that a person has made based on a combination 
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of memorial and extra-memorial information, the person‘s memory might be brought closer 
in line with that judgment than it had been before. 
Collaborative Recall 
Research on whether or not people will conform to the memory of another person 
during free recall sessions is not new. It has been found that free recall of an event following 
group collaboration decreases errors of omission but increases errors of commission when 
compared to free recall of an event by an individual alone (Alper, Buckhout, Chern, 
Harwood, & Slomovits, 1976; Warnick & Sanders, 1980). People who collaborate about their 
memory for an event also have higher confidence in the truth of their answers than people 
who report on their memory individually, regardless of the accuracy of these memorial 
reports (Allwood, Granhag, & Johansson, 2003; Stephenson, Abrams, Wagner, & Wade, 
1986). Knowing that their memory is corroborated by others increases people‘s confidence in 
the veracity of their memory. This unsubstantiated confidence inflation due to collaboration 
can be lessened if witnesses think about their accounts of the event individually before 
discussing them with a co-witness (Stephenson, & Wagner, 1989).  
When people are asked to recall information about an incident alone and then as a 
pair, overall more details are recalled between the members of the pair than when each 
member was alone; however, no new information emerges from the discussion (Meudell, 
Hitch, & Kirby, 1992). Therefore, combining the free-recall responses of two witnesses who 
recall an event individually and having two witnesses collaborate on their recall for an event 
produce the same number of correct details about the event. This is what would be expected 
from the ―pooling of abilities‖ model that predicts that if one participant remembers five 
details: a, b, c, d, and e and another participant remembers five details: c, d, e, f, and g, then 
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together they remember seven details: a, b, c, d, e, f, and g (Lorge & Solomon, 1955). 
Therefore, they remember more items jointly than they would remember individually, even 
though no new information has emerged from the discussion. 
Sometimes when groups collaborate on memory, however, they recall less 
information as a group than as individuals, and this phenomenon has been termed 
collaborative inhibition (Basden, Basden, Byrne, & Thomas, 1997; Finlay, Hitch, & Meudell, 
2000; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997; Weldon, Blair, & Huebsch, 2000). This effect is posited to 
arise from one of two processes: retrieval interference or motivational factors. Retrieval 
interference arises because hearing a member of the group recall his or her memory can 
disrupt another‘s organizational and retrieval strategies (Basden et al.). However, 
collaborative inhibition appears less in small groups, such as pairs, than in large groups 
(Finlay et al.). The motivational factors present in collaborative inhibition tend to function 
like social loafing, which is when people exert less effort on group tasks than when working 
alone (Karau & Williams, 2001). Social loafing tends to arise from a sense of diminished 
personal responsibility, a perceived dispensability of effort, an attempt to achieve equity of 
effort, a diffusion of responsibility, evaluation apprehension, or some combination of these 
variables (Collaros & Anderson, 1969; Latané & Nida, 1981; Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 
1979).  
Because of retrieval interference and motivational factors, collaboration on recall 
tasks does not appear to be beneficial over and above the pooling of resources and can 
actually harm accuracy on recall tasks. In a situation in which a collaborator merely suggests 
that participant-witnesses have seen an object that they have not, the participant-witnesses 
will typically later report seeing an object that they, in fact, never saw (Gabbert, Memon, & 
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Allan, 2003). The co-witness information can be conceived of as post-event misinformation, 
which can interfere with retrieval of the original memory that a person has due to source 
monitoring errors (Ayers & Reder, 1998; Davis & Loftus, 2007; Loftus, 1975; 1991; Loftus 
et al., 1978; Roediger et al., 2001; Wright & Loftus, 1998). Source monitoring errors arise 
when people become confused about the source of their memory and are unsure whether their 
memory comes from watching an event or from information given to them later, either 
directly or indirectly, from a co-witness, an investigator, or an experimenter (Cronbag, 
Wagenaar, & VanKoppen, 1996; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 1994; 
Lindsay & Johnson, 1991; Mather Shafir, & Johnson, 2000). 
Collaborative Recognition 
When individuals are asked to recognize information or objects in groups, the pattern 
is not as straight forward as it is for collaborative recall. For positive identifications— when a 
person says that an object was present in a previously-studied list or scene—peoples‘ hits are 
more accurate in pairs or groups than alone (Clark, Hori, Putnam, & Martin, 2000; Rajaram 
& Pereira-Pasarin, 2007; Schneider & Watkins, 1996; Skagerberg, 2007). Collaborative 
recognition does not tend to show a pattern towards collaborative inhibition as is the case 
with collaboration during recall, but rather tends to make collaborative recognition judgments 
more accurate than individual recognition judgments (Hinsz, 1990; Vollrath, Sheppard, 
Hinsz, & Davis, 1989), and this facilitation tends to go above and beyond that of just a 
pooling of resources (Clark et al.). Additionally, if there has been an increase in correct 
responses from when an individual attempted to recognize information alone and then in 
pairs, then there can be an increased proportion of hits to false alarms during later tests, even 
a week after the original studying of the words (Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2007). 
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Although this pattern seems encouraging, other researchers have found quite different 
results in collaborative recognition settings. In a few experiments, people were asked to 
recognize, in a multiple-choice test, information from a story that they had just read and were 
later given bogus feedback about the answers that other participants in the study had chosen 
(Betz, Skowronski, & Ostrom, 1996; Wright, Matthews, & Skagerberg, 2005). These people 
tended to conform to the answers that the majority of the other participants had chosen (Betz 
et al.), especially for items that they had not originally seen (Wright et al.). This conformity 
effect continued, even when the participants were told that the information they were given 
about the other participants‘ answers was bogus (Betz et al.). Additionally, the answers 
provided by other people who have studied the same list of words or have seen the same 
scene tend to persevere (Shaw, Garven, & Wood, 1997). The new information seems to 
become incorporated into a person‘s memory, competing with the accurate information that a 
person has, even two days after the event and initial questioning, much like what occurs with 
post-event misinformation.  
Additionally, when being asked to state whether or not an object was present in a 
previously-studied list or set of pictures, people tend to conform to the answers of their 
partner, regardless of whether the answers are correct or incorrect (Schneider & Watkins, 
1996; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). However, the level of conformity is greatly reduced if 
the partner who goes first states that the object was not present (i.e., gives a negative answer) 
in the studied list. This happens regardless of whether the object was actually present or not 
in the studied list (Schneider & Watkins, 1996). Because ―it is easier to present an argument 
as to why one should believe that an event happened than an argument as to why one should 
believe that an event did not happen‖ (Clark et al., 2000, p. 1586), the facilitation for 
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recognition memory in groups breaks down when it comes to rejecting distractors. Therefore, 
the facilitation of recognition memory through collaboration tends to decrease if the target is 
not present in the stimuli for the recognition task. 
Collaborative Memory Among Eyewitnesses 
The majority of work on collaborative memory has been done with recall or 
recognition of items such as words, leaves, or cars (e.g., Finlay et al., 2000; Lima , Jaswal, & 
Dodson, 2007; Meudell et al., 1992; Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2007; Roediger et al., 2001; 
Schneider & Watkins, 1996; Weldon et al., 2000). A situation in which collaborative 
memory occurs in the real world that can have extreme consequences is when people witness 
a crime and later attempt to identify the perpetrator of the crime in a lineup. However, 
research that has examined collaborative memory with eyewitnesses has not typically 
focused on facial recognition, (e.g., Allwood et al., 2003; Alper et al., 1976; Gabbert et al., 
2003; Shaw et al., 1997; Stephenson & Wagner, 1989; Warnick & Sanders, 1980, but see 
Loftus & Greene, 1980 for post-event information about facial features and Skagerberg, 
2007, for one study about collaboration on facial recognition). The current research will 
examine the influence that information about a witness‘s identification decision about a 
target-absent lineup can have on another‘s identification decision and confidence in that 
decision.   
Eyewitness Confidence 
A person who expresses confidence in his or her memory tends to appear more 
knowledgeable about that event than a person who does not express confidence in his or her 
memory. Typically, the more knowledge a person is perceived to have, the more valuable he 
or she will be as a guide to others, especially in a situation in which the answer is ambiguous 
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(Allison, 1992; Bickman, 1974; Cialdini & Trost, 1998), such as is the case in lineups. The 
current research will test the power of confidence in a memory to persuade a person to 
conform by presenting participant-witnesses with information about a co-witness who has 
made an identification decision with either high or low confidence in that decision.  
Effects of eyewitness confidence on independent observers. Eyewitnesses who express 
high confidence in their identifications are believed to be more accurate than eyewitnesses 
who express low to moderate confidence in their identifications (e.g., Bradfield & Wells, 
2000; Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990; Fox & Walters, 1986; 
Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981; Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, 1979). The reason that 
people more readily believe confident eyewitnesses is a presumption of calibration (Tenney, 
MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007). Triers of fact believe that people will be highly 
confident in a judgment when they are correct and not very confident in a judgment when 
they are incorrect. In fact, if a highly confident witness makes a mistake and that mistake is 
discovered by triers of fact, then the entire testimony by that witness is undermined (Tenney, 
et al.). However, in general, an independent observer who has not viewed the same scene as a 
witness trusts a confident witness‘s identification decision more than a non-confident 
witness‘s identification decision. 
If participant-witnesses learn that their co-witness is confident in his or her 
identification decision, then it is possible that they will accept the decision as accurate until 
proven otherwise. When people see, hear, or learn a piece of information, they tend to take it 
at face value and assume it to be true, and it is only after accepting the veracity of a fact that 
they can go through the effort of deciding whether it might be false and un-accept this 
information if necessary (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990; Gilbert, Tafarodi, & 
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Malone, 1993; Krull & Dill, 1996). This is because people have a tendency to look for ways 
to confirm their hypothesis (Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1977; Nickerson, 1998; Wason, 
1960) and because once a hypothesis has been formed, it is difficult to change, even in the 
face of disconfirming evidence (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Anderson & Lindsay, 
1998; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975).  
Effects of eyewitness confidence on observers who have viewed the same scene as the 
eyewitness. There is considerable experimental evidence that confident eyewitnesses are 
believed more readily than are non-confident eyewitnesses (e.g., Bradfield & Wells, 2000; 
Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Cutler et al., 1990; Fox & Walters, 1986; Tenney et al., 2007; 
Wells et al., 1981; Wells et al., 1979). Nevertheless, the people who evaluated the 
eyewitnesses in these experiments did not have their own, independent memories of the 
event. There is some evidence that people with an independent recollection may not pay 
much attention to the extent to which a co-witness should have a better or worse memory for 
the event than them. Manipulations of how long a view a co-witness had versus how long a 
view a participant had did not have much of an effect on whether or not the participant relied 
on the co-witness when making a recognition judgment (Lima et al., 2007). However, the 
length of time that a supposed co-witness had to view an event might not convey to the 
participants that the co-witness has a better or worse memory than them for the event because 
participants might not believe that the length of time they have to view the event would be 
calibrated with accuracy. A better test of this might be to manipulate the supposed quality of 
the view of the co-witness or the distance that the co-witness was from the event.  
In the current research, it is predicted that the confidence with which a co-witness 
makes an identification decision will influence the participant-witnesses. This is because, as 
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discussed earlier, an eyewitness who inherently has a strong drive to be accurate should take 
into account as many memorial and extra-memorial variables as possible when making an 
identification decision. Therefore, eyewitnesses may be very susceptible to information from 
others. When negotiating the perceived validity of the memorial and extra-memorial factors, 
the discrepancy between the co-witness‘s expressed confidence and the participant-witness‘s 
internal confidence in the identification decision should be a determining factor in the 
participant-witness‘s decision. 
Plausibility  
Plausibility of an opinion. The plausibility of a co-witness‘s identification decision is 
another factor that is hypothesized to affect the extent to which the co-witness‘s decision is 
taken into consideration by the participant-witness. A person‘s opinion, such as who, if 
anybody, in a lineup looks like the perpetrator of a crime, provides a starting point for his or 
her latitude of acceptance (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977; Sherif, Sherif & Nerbergall, 
1965). An opinion that is not very discrepant from a person‘s own opinion, such as a 
plausible identification decision, might fall within his or her latitude of acceptance about that 
opinion, and an opinion that is extremely discrepant from a person‘s own opinion, such as an 
implausible identification decision, might fall within his or her latitude of rejection. 
Additionally, the more plausible an identification is, the more likely it is to fall in a witness‘s 
latitude of acceptance, but the less plausible an identification is, the more likely it is to fall in 
a witness‘s latitude of rejection. Information about a target that falls into a person‘s latitude 
of acceptance has the potential to influence that person‘s later opinions about that target 
(Sherif et al.). Therefore, information about a co-witness who makes a plausible 
identification decision that falls into a witness‘s latitude of acceptance might influence a 
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witness to shift his or her initial decision to either come closer to or match the co-witness‘s 
decision. However, information about a target that falls into a person‘s latitude of rejection 
should not influence that person‘s later opinions about the target. Therefore, information 
about a co-witness who makes an implausible identification, falling outside of a witness‘s 
latitude of rejection, should be rejected by the witness and, therefore, not impact the 
witness‘s identification decision. 
What would happen if a very implausible identification were expressed by a very 
credible source? The implausibility of an opinion that a person expresses cannot exceed his 
or her credibility, otherwise that person‘s opinion will be dismissed (Aronson, Turner, & 
Carlsmith, 1963). An interaction exists between the perceived credibility of a person and the 
degree to which an extreme opinion or decision by that person will serve to influence others. 
Aronson and his colleagues presented participants with a mediocre poem that was supposedly 
evaluated by either T.S. Elliot—a credible source about poetry—or Miss Agnes Sterns—a 
student at Mississippi State Teachers College. The larger the discrepancy between the T.S. 
Elliot‘s and the participant‘s opinion, the greater the participant‘s opinion change toward the 
opinion of the T. S. Elliot. However, Miss Agnes Stern‘s evaluation of the poem only 
induced opinion change up to a point. When the mildly-credible evaluator‘s position was 
very extreme or discrepant from the participant‘s view, participants did not change their 
opinion much at all. This is because Miss Agnes Stern was not considered a credible enough 
source on poetry to convince participants to conform to an opinion that was extremely 
discrepant from their own opinion. 
Plausibility of a co-witness’s identification. The current research manipulated the 
discrepancy of the co-witness‘s identification decision from the participant-witness‘s 
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memory by varying the plausibility of the co-witness‘s identification decision. The co-
witness was said to identify a plausible lineup member, an implausible lineup member, or 
reject the lineup. Past research has shown that witnesses who, after making an identification, 
are given feedback about a co-witness who has chosen an implausible other lineup member, 
have a significant increase in their confidence in their original identification (Luus & Wells, 
1994). This demonstrates that the plausibility of a co-witness‘s identification decision matters 
to the participant-witness, even after both witnesses have made an identification decision. 
This is probably because the participant-witnesses are engaging in some form of negotiation 
of the extra-memorial information with their memorial information. The participant-
witnesses in the study by Luus and Wells were obviously being discriminating about whether 
or not they would consider the co-witness‘s identification when determining their own 
answers to testimony-relevant questions. When the co-witness‘s identification was 
implausible, the participant-witnesses clearly dismissed the implausible identification 
decision. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This research is based on persuasion to make a particular recognition judgment, as 
opposed to the research by Aronson and colleagues (1963) that was done on opinion 
persuasion. Therefore, part of the question in the current study is whether or not the classic 
work on the interaction between credibility and position extremity will apply to the co-
witness situation. In the case of a witness who learns that a co-witness allegedly identified a 
person who looks extremely different than the witness‘s memory and is therefore 
implausible, only a highly confident co-witness might have a chance to have an impact on the 
witness‘s decision. A condition in which a co-witness expresses high confidence in an 
identification but the identification is an implausible one is included in the current 
experiment. It is one of the more interesting conditions because this is where the greatest 
conflict exists between the memorial and extra-memorial information. 
If a co-witness makes an implausible identification and does so without much 
confidence in the decision, then the co-witness should not have much influence on the 
identification decision of the participant-witness. Given the above-mentioned findings by 
Luus and Wells (1994), the participant-witnesses who find out that a co-witness has made an 
implausible identification may even increase their confidence in their own identification 
decisions. However, if a co-witness makes an implausible identification but does so with 
high confidence, then the participant-witnesses may conform to the highly implausible 
identification of a highly credible co-witness. Therefore, both the identification that the co-
witness makes and the confidence that the co-witness expresses in this decision are expected 
to have an effect on the identification decision and confidence level of a participant-witness. 
23 
 
One important design feature in the current experiments is that, in plausible 
identification conditions, the co-witness‘s choice is manipulated between two different 
members of the lineup. This allowed me to see whether any increase in the identifications of 
one of the plausible lineup members was accompanied by a decrease in ―not there‖ decisions 
or accompanied by a decrease in identifications of a different plausible lineup member. 
Consider, for example, that #3 is one plausible identification and #6 is the other plausible 
identification. Participants who receive plausible co-witness information were randomly 
assigned to be told that the co-witness identified #3 or #6. A decrease in the rate of ―not 
there‖ identification decisions when participants are told that the co-witness identified either 
plausible lineup member would indicate a potential criterion shift as a function of this co-
witness information. However, participants who lower their decision criterion after being told 
that a co-witness identified a plausible lineup member, might just identify the best-match. 
Participants who have a low enough decision criterion to make an identification decision 
without receiving information about the co-witness might have a good memory for the 
perpetrator and identify the best-match. However if there are two best-matches and co-
witness information about one of the best-matches pulls identification decisions from the 
other best-match, then it would be indicative of something other than a decision criterion 
shift influencing participants‘ identification decisions. 
Recognition judgments, especially those made by eyewitnesses, are influenced by 
both memorial and extra-memorial information. This research examined the extent to which 
different types of extra-memorial information would affect the ultimate identification 
judgments made by eyewitnesses. This study looked at the extent to which a participant-
witness conformed to a co-witness‘s confident or non-confident identification decision about 
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a target-absent lineup. Additionally, this study examined how the plausibility of the co-
witness‘s identification affected this potential co-witness conformity. This experiment is a 
2(Confidence: high, low) x 3(Identification decision: plausible, implausible, not-there) 
between-subjects design, with an additional control condition in which participants were not 
be given any information about the co-witness‘s identification decision.  
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METHOD 
Five hundred and four students from a large Midwestern university received partial 
course credit for their participation in this study. The participants were told by the 
experimenter that the study was designed to examine how accurate two people could be 
about an identification decision without explicitly speaking to one another. Participants were 
ostensibly yoked with another participant who viewed or would view the crime on the 
computer to which they were assigned. However, they did not know whether they were the 
first or second person of the pair that would be run in the study. The remainder of the study 
was completed on the computers utilizing MediaLab software. 
Participants watched a video of a simulated crime that lasted approximately 60s. The 
scene was shot from the perspective of a person entering an office that has a window 
overlooking an attached roof. In the video, the perpetrator was seen on the roof, putting an 
object in an airshaft, and the person was filmed from approximately 15ft (6m) away from the 
camera. After the cameraman ostensibly realized that the activity on the roof was suspicious, 
the camera zoomed in to 6ft (1.8m) away from the perpetrator‘s face. Once the perpetrator 
noticed that he was being watched, he dropped the object down the airshaft and ran through a 
rooftop door. The video then continued in the hallway of the building. There the viewer 
caught a glimpse of the perpetrator running down the hallway and glancing briefly at the 
camera before running down a flight of stairs out of view. The perpetrator of the crime was a 
21-year-old male with short, dark hair, medium build, and no facial hair. 
After viewing the video, participants were told:  
In a moment you will see a group of photos and be asked: ‗Which of these people, if 
anyone, was the person you saw commit the crime today?‘ The person who 
committed the crime may or may not be included in the group of photos. Keep in 
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mind that things like hair styles, beards, and mustaches can be easily changed and 
that complexion colors may look slightly different in photographs.  
 
Participants were then told that the names of each member of the pair who made an accurate 
identification decision would be put into a drawing for $20. This was done in order to ensure 
that participants felt a sense of connection with their fictitious partner and to enhance their 
motivation to provide an accurate identification decision. Before viewing a lineup, 
participants in the experimental group were told the identification decision their partner made 
and the confidence with which their partner made that decision.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a ―not there‖ 
decision, a plausible identification decision, or implausible identification decision. In the 
―not-there‖ decision condition, participants saw that their partner said that the perpetrator 
was not present in the lineup. In the plausible identification condition, participants saw that 
their partner identified a member of the lineup who very nearly resembles the perpetrator of 
the crime. The plausible identifications were split between two plausible lineup members (#3 
and #6). In the implausible identification conditions, participants saw that their partner 
identified a member of the lineup who looked very little like the perpetrator of the crime. The 
plausible and implausible lineup members were selected based on pilot data indications that 
they were the two lineup members who were most likely to be mistakenly identified as the 
perpetrator. Additionally, participants were randomly assigned to learn that their partner was 
either highly confident (98%) or moderately confident (55%) in his or her decision. An 
additional group of participants did not receive information about the identification that the 
co-witness made or the confidence with which the co-witness made that decision, and this 
group served as the control condition. After viewing the identification decision and the 
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confidence with which their partner made the identification decision, participants were 
shown the lineup and were asked to indicate their identification decision and their confidence 
in that decision.  
The control condition was designed to determine the base rate for each identification 
decision without co-witness influence and a large number of participants in this condition 
would serve to stabilize this base rate information. Although the 504 previously-mentioned 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions or the control 
condition in this experiment, an additional 64 participants were run in the control condition 
in Experiment 2. The stability of the base rate for the control condition is important because 
difference scores from the control condition were repeatedly made with the planned 
contrasts. Hence, there was an interest in collapsing the control conditions for the two 
experiments. Because of the slight differences in the timing and methodology of data 
collection between the two groups of individuals run in the control condition, a comparison 
was made of the identification decisions made by the control condition participants in the two 
experiments. There was not a significant difference between the control conditions in the rate 
at which each identification decision was made, Χ2(5, N = 129) = 4.721, p = .451. Therefore, 
the two control groups were collapsed for all subsequent analyses in order to increase the 
stability of the base rate information. 
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RESULTS 
It was hypothesized that information about a co-witness‘s identification decision and 
confidence in that decision would affect participants‘ own identification decisions and their 
confidence in those decisions. Therefore, I compared the rates at which participants made the 
seven possible identification decisions (i.e., identified numbers 1, 2,…6, or said ―not there‖) 
across the experimental conditions. I then compared the proportion of participants in each 
experimental condition who made the same identification decision as the co-witness to the 
proportion of participants in the control condition who made that identification decision. 
Additionally, I examined the level of confidence the participants expressed in their 
identification decision as a function of the identification decision of the co-witness, the 
confidence of the co-witness, and whether or not the participant made the same identification 
decision as the co-witness.  
 Of the 568 participants run in the study, 54 were excluded from analysis because they 
had taken a class in which eyewitness variables were discussed or had seen the ―crime‖ video 
and lineup at some point before participating in the experiment. Therefore, data analyses are 
based on 514 participants. 
Identification Response Data 
Control Identification Rates 
A One-way Chi-Square test across the seven choice possibilities (lineup members 1-6 
and ―not there‖) revealed, as expected, that choices were not evenly distributed across the 
seven possibilities in the control condition, Χ2(5, N = 129) = 57.00, p < .001. A ―not there‖ 
response was the correct identification decision, and 37.2% of the participants in the control 
condition gave a ―not there‖ response. (See Figure 3.) The two plausible lineup members (#3 
29 
 
and #6) exceeded the average ―other‖ filler choices by approximately 10%. They were 
chosen by 22.4% and 11.6% of the participants, respectively, with an average identification 
rate of 17.0%. Lineup Member #1 received 15.5% of the identifications in the control 
condition, but this lineup member was not designated a priori as one of the plausible lineup 
members. This is because pilot data indicated that Lineup Members #1, #3, and #6 were 
mistakenly identified in the lineup at approximately equal rates. Two of the lineup members 
were chosen based on a judgment made by the author about which of the three most 
resembled the perpetrator. The implausible lineup member, #2, was truly implausible, and no 
participants in the control condition identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. 
Overall Identification Rate Change in Experimental Conditions 
 Did the manipulated variables affect the distribution of choice responses across the 
seven choice possibilities? A three-way hierarchical loglinear analysis by backward 
elimination was carried out to determine associations between co-witness choice (four 
categories: not there, plausible #1, plausible #2, implausible) and co-witness confidence (two 
levels: high and low) on witness choices (seven categories: identify 1, 2,…6. or ―not there‖). 
The interaction between co-witness choice and co-witness confidence was not significant, 
Χ2(18, N = 385) = 20.66, p = .30. Although there were significant combined main effects for 
co-witness choice and co-witness confidence, Χ2(27, N = 385) = 96.12, p < .001, the 
generating class of the final model only included the main effect of co-witness decision on 
participants‘ identification choices. Because confidence was not a moderating variable of the 
participants‘ identification decisions, subsequent analyses of identification rates were 
collapsed across co-witness confidence levels. 
30 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of participants in the control condition making each identification 
decision. 
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Although the co-witness‘s identification appears to have had an effect on the 
participants‘ identification decisions, differences across these decisions might merely be a 
result of different base rates for each of the possible identification decisions. As can be seen 
in Figure 3, control rates for the critical identification decisions (Not there, Lineup Member 
#3, Lineup Member #6, and Lineup Member #2) ranged from 0% to 37%. Therefore, 
subsequent analyses are composed of contrasts using z-tests of proportions on differences 
(changes) in proportions between the control condition and the experimental conditions. 
Identification Rate Change From Control in Each Condition 
 Change in the direction of the co-witness’s decision. Co-witness identification 
choices had differential impact on the identification choices of participants. However, was 
this merely due to the differing base rates for the identification decisions that the co-witness 
made? Participants who were told that their co-witness said the perpetrator was not in the 
lineup gave a ―not there‖ response more often than did those in the control condition, z = 
3.999, p < .001. As can be seen in Table 1, the participants who learned that the co-witness 
correctly rejected the lineup significantly increased the rate at which they also said that the 
perpetrator was not in the lineup by 25.0%
1
. Similarly, participants who were told that their 
co-witness identified Lineup Member #3, a plausible identification choice, increased the rate 
at which they also identified Lineup Member #3 by 16.3%, z = 2.413, p = .016. Even 
participants who were told that their co-witness made an identification of Lineup Member #2, 
an implausible identification choice, significantly increased their identification of Lineup 
Member #2 by 14.8%, z = 4.547, p < .001. Participants who learned that their co-witness 
                                                             
1 A table with increases from the control condition in the proportion of participants giving the same responses as 
the co-witness separated by confidence level of the co-witness can be found in Appendix A. 
2
 A table with percent increases from the control condition in participants giving the same responses as the co-
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identified Lineup Member #6, another plausible identification choice, were only 6.8% more 
likely to identify Lineup Member #6 than were the participants in the control condition, an 
effect that was not statistically significant, z = 1.298, p = .194. 
 Because identification rates for Lineup Member #6 did not significantly differ 
between the experimental and control conditions, some questions arise about the validity of 
the ―plausible‖ and ―implausible‖ labels. Lineup Member #6 was only identified as the 
perpetrator 11.6% of the time, a mere 4.4% more than the average lineup member not 
identified a priori as ―plausible‖. Therefore, it is possible that Lineup Member #6 was not 
actually a plausible identification option because to be a plausible option he would have to be 
chosen at a significantly higher than average rate in the control condition. However, even the 
implausible lineup member received a significant boost in identification rates when 
participants were told that a co-witness identified him. 
 Change from control in identification rates across conditions. Did the co-witness 
conditions (i.e., not there, plausible, or implausible) have differential magnitudes of impact 
on the participants‘ identification decisions? In order to answer this question, a comparison 
was made across conditions of z-scores that represent the amount of change in proportions 
between the control condition and the experimental conditions. Information about a co-
witness who identified an implausible lineup member increased the identification rate of that 
lineup member more than information about a co-witness who identified the plausible lineup 
members, Lineup Member #3 and Lineup Member #6, increased the identification rate of 
those lineup members, z = 2.134, p = .033; z = 3.249, p = .001, respectively. However, there 
was not a significant difference in the increase from control in the same identification 
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decisions as the co-witness for an identification of the implausible lineup member and a ―not 
there‖ decision, z = .548, p = .583. Remember that although a co-witness‘s identification of  
Table 1. Increases from control condition in the proportion of participants giving the same 
responses as the co-witness. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
       % change                
Condition    from control      z-score        p-value           95% CI 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Co-witness says ―not there‖        .245              3.999         <.001            (.131, .369) 
Co-witness says #3 (plausible)       .163              2.413           .016            (.026, .300) 
Co-witness says #6 (plausible)       .068              1.298           .194            (-.041 .178) 
Co-witness says #2 (implausible)       .148              4.547         <.001            (.087, .210) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Lineup Member #3, a plausible lineup member, resulted in a significant increase from the 
control group of identifications of Lineup Member #3; the same was not true for Lineup 
Member #6, the other plausible lineup member. However, there was not a significant 
difference between how much influence a co-witness‘s identification of each of these 
plausible identifications had on the increase in identification rates for each, z = 1.115, p = 
.265. Additionally, there was not a significant difference between the influence that a co-
witness who said the perpetrator was not in the lineup and influence a co-witness who says 
the perpetrator is Lineup Member #3, a plausible lineup member, on the rates of participants 
making the same decision as the co-witness, z = 1.586, p = .113. However, a co-witness who 
said the perpetrator was not in the lineup had a greater influence on the rates of participants 
making the same decision as the co-witness, than a co-witness who said the perpetrator was 
Lineup Member #6, a plausible lineup member, , z = 2.701, p = .006. 
 Identification rate change from control for the potentially influenced participants. 
Although the absolute change in identification rates is one way to examine the influence that 
a co-witness has on participants‘ identification decisions, this does not take into 
consideration that the percentage of participants who have the potential to be influenced in 
each condition is different. What role should the base identification rate play in the 
estimation of the influence of co-witness information? In the control condition, 37.2% of 
participants said that the perpetrator was not present in the lineup. Therefore, only 62.8% of 
participants who received information that the co-witness said the perpetrator was not present 
in the lineup could have been influenced. Therefore, the increase of 25.0% of ―not there‖ 
decisions for participants who learned that their co-witness rejected the lineup underestimates 
the influence of the co-witness. Considering that only 62.8% of the participants who learned 
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that the co-witness said that the perpetrator was not in the lineup had the potential to be 
influenced, it is estimated that 39.8% (25.0% of the 62.8%) of those who could have been 
affected by the co-witness information were in fact affected. 
A similar result occurs when identifications of Lineup Member #3, a plausible lineup 
member, are examined. In the control condition, Lineup Member #3 was identified by 22.5% 
of the participants, leaving only 77.5% of participants who received information that the co-
witness identified Lineup Member #3 to have the potential to be influenced. Therefore, the 
identification rate increase of 16.3% of Lineup Member #3 for participants who learned that 
their co-witness identified Lineup Member #3 underestimates the influence of the co-witness. 
Of those who could have been affected by the co-witness information about Lineup Member 
#3, approximately 21.0% (16.3% of the 77.5%) were. 
As the baseline identification rate of the person the co-witness identified decreases, 
the increase in identification rates by those participants who have the potential to be 
influenced diminishes. Lineup Member #6, a plausible lineup member, was only identified 
11.6% of the time in the control condition. Therefore, a full 88.4% of the participants who 
learned that Lineup Member #6 was identified by the co-witness could have been influenced. 
Although the increase in identifications of Lineup Member #6 is 6.8% when all participants 
who were told that their co-witness identified Lineup Member #6 are examined, it is 
estimated that the increase in identifications of Lineup Member #6 was 7.7% (6.8% of 
88.4%) when only the participants who had the potential to be influenced are examined. 
Because no participants in the control condition identified Lineup Member #2, the 14.8% 
increase of identifications of Lineup Member #2 when the participants are told that a co-
witness identified Lineup member #2, is an accurate estimation of the extent to which 
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participants who had the potential to be influenced in this condition were affected by that co-
witness information. 
A somewhat more dramatic pattern emerges when the baseline percentage of 
participants who have the potential to be influenced is taken into account than when only the 
absolute increase in identification rates is examined. When only the participants who have 
the potential to be influenced are taken into consideration, it is estimated that the co-witness 
who said that the perpetrator was not in the lineup influenced 39.8%, the co-witness who said 
that the perpetrator was Lineup Member #3 influenced 21.0%, the co-witness who said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member#2 influenced 14.8%, and the co-witness who said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #6 influenced only 7.7% of the potentially influenced 
participants. 
Identification rate change for other identification decisions across conditions. 
Because responses across the seven possible response categories must total 100%, an 
increase in rates of identification that are in agreement with the co-witness must be 
accompanied by an equal decrease in the sum of the other six possible responses. Hence, for 
each analysis of increases in agreement with the co-witness, I also examined decreases in 
responses for each of the other six possible responses (again, decreases relative to the 
control). Figure 4 displays the change in identification rates from the control group for each 
of the identification decisions when the participant is told that the co-witness says that the 
perpetrator was not present in the lineup.  
Along with the significant increase in participants who said that the perpetrator was 
not in the lineup,  there was a significant decrease in the identification rate of Lineup 
Members #3 and #4, z = 2.479, p = .013, and z = 2.605, p = .009, respectively. Lineup  
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Figure 4. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was not in the lineup. 
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Member #3 was identified 22.5% of the time in the control group but only 10.9% of the time 
when the co-witness said that the perpetrator was not present in the lineup. Lineup Member 
#4 was identified 11.6% of the time in the control group but only 3.1% of the time when the 
co-witness said that the perpetrator was not present in the lineup. This result, showing most 
of the increase in ―not-there‖ responses coming from Lineup Member #3, is not surprising 
because Lineup Member #3 received most of the choices in the control condition. Therefore, 
more participants can be moved from their identification choice of Lineup Members #1, 3, 
and 6 than, for instance, Lineup Members #2 and 5 because there were no choices of Lineup 
Member #2 and few choices of # 5 in the control condition. 
 As can be seen in Figure 5, the 20.3% increase in identifications of Lineup Member 
#3 for participants who learned about a co-witness who identified Lineup Member #3 was 
accompanied by a marginally significant decrease in identifications of Lineup Member #1, z 
= 1.931, p = .053. In fact, even though Lineup Member #1 received 20.0% of the 
identification choices in the control condition, less than 6% of participants who learned that 
the co-witness made an identification of #3 went on to identify Lineup Member #1 as the 
perpetrator of the crime. This significant decrease in identifications of Lineup Member #1 
when participants learned that the co-witness identified Lineup Member # 3 is a particularly 
important result because the two parameter models (such as the WITNESS model) cannot 
accommodate such a result. 
Participants who were told that their co-witness identified Lineup Member #6, a 
plausible identification, did not show a significant increase from control in the rate of 
identifications of Lineup Member #6. Accordingly, there was also not a significant decrease 
in any of the other identification choices from the control identification rates. (See Figure 6.)  
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Figure 5. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #3. 
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Figure 6. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #6. 
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Figure 7. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #2. 
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As can be seen in Figure 7, there was a significant increase in identifications of 
Lineup Member #2, the implausible lineup member, for participants who were told that the 
co-witness identified Lineup Member #2. Although this increase in identifications of the 
implausible lineup member was not accompanied by a significant decrease from the control 
identification rate in the proportion of participants who made any specific other identification 
decision, most of this effect appears to be a result of decreases in rates of those who would 
have made ―not there‖ decisions and those who would have identified Lineup Member #3. 
Confidence Response Data 
 Would the confidence of participants in their identification decisions be influenced by 
the information about the co-witness‘s identification behavior and whether or not the 
participants made the same decision as him or her? A 3(co-witness choice: four categories: 
not there, plausibles, implausible) x 2(co-witness confidence: high, low) x 2(participant 
identification: same as co-witness, different than co-witness) ANOVA was conducted in 
order to answer this question. The identification decision that the co-witness made (not there, 
plausibles, or implausible) did not significantly influence how confident participants were in 
their identification decisions, F(2,373) = 1.66, p = .19, Cohen‘s f = .002. However, 
participants who learned about a co-witness who made an identification decision with high 
confidence expressed significantly more confidence in their identification decision than those 
who learned that the identification decision was made with low confidence, F(1,373) = 
88.01, p < .001, Cohen‘s f = .24. (See Figure 8.) Additionally, participants were more 
confident in their identification decision of they made the same identification as the co-
witness than if they made a different identification than the co-witness, F(1,373) = 88.01, p < 
.001, Cohen‘s f = .24. Because there were no significant differences in the results when the  
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Figure 8. Participants‘ confidence in their identification decisions, regardless of 
identification decision. 
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plausible identification choices were combined or separated, they have been combined for 
the purposes of subsequent analyses. 
The confidence participants expressed about their identification varied as a function 
of the identification decision the co-witness made and whether or not the participant made 
the same decision as the co-witness, F(2,373) = 9.57, p < .001, Cohen‘s f = .05. (See Figure 
9.) A one-way ANOVA for participants who made the same decision as their co-witness 
revealed that these participants were more confident in the identification if they agreed with 
the co-witness that the perpetrator was not present in the lineup or that the perpetrator was a 
plausible lineup member, than if they agreed with the co-witness that the perpetrator was an 
implausible lineup member, F(2,133) = 3.83, p = .02. However, a one-way ANOVA on 
participants who made different decisions than their co-witness revealed that these 
participants did not significantly differ in their confidence in their identification decision, 
regardless of who the co-witness identified, F(2,246) = 2.66, p = .07. Contrary to the 
hypothesized pattern, there was not a significant interaction between the co-witness‘s 
identification decision and the co-witness‘s confidence or between the co-witness‘s 
identification decision and whether participants made the same or different decision than the 
co-witness on participant confidence, F(2,373) = 2.23, p = .11, Cohen‘s f = .01; F(1,373) = 
.468, p = .49, Cohen‘s f < .001, respectively. Additionally, the three-way interaction amongst 
co-witness identification decision, co-witness confidence, and whether or not participants 
made the same decision as the co-witness was not significant, F(2,373) = .930, p = .40, 
Cohen‘s f = .07. 
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Figure 9. Participants‘ confidence in their identification decision as a function of making the 
same or different identification decision as a co-witness who made a ―not there,‖ plausible, or 
implausible identification decision. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The WITNESS model is the dominant computational conceptualization of eyewitness 
identification behavior and is designed specifically to describe eyewitness choices in lineups 
(Clark 2003, 2005). The WITNESS model is a traditional model of recognition behavior, 
similar to signal detection models of recognition judgments, which incorporates two 
parameters: signal strength and decision criterion. According to the model, an eyewitness 
will make an identification if the weighted sum of the best match and the difference between 
the best match and next-best match is above the eyewitness‘s identification decision 
criterion. Additionally, according to the model an eyewitness will say that the perpetrator is 
not present if each of the individual lineup members‘ match values is below the eyewitness‘s 
rejection decision criterion.  
Although the match and decision-criterion parameters appear to do a reasonable job 
of accommodating many of the eyewitness identification studies in the literature, the data 
from Experiment 1 challenge the WITNESS model and any other conceptualization that 
relies solely on these two parameters. In particular, neither the match parameter nor the 
decision-criterion parameter appears able to explain how the implausible co-witness 
condition led to a significant increase in choices of that implausible lineup member. The data 
from the control condition are compelling in showing that no one naturally selects this 
implausible lineup member and that it is the other lineup members instead who have the best 
match characteristics. Regardless of whether this increase in choices of the implausible 
lineup member were being drawn from ―not there‖ participants (which some appear to be, 
see Figure 7) or from one of the plausible lineup members (some are coming from Lineup 
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Member #1, see Figure 7), neither the decision criterion parameter nor the match parameter 
can predict or explain this finding. 
Additionally, a problem exists for the WITNESS model in explaining why there was 
a significant decrease in identifications of Lineup Member #1 when participants learned that 
the co-witness identified Lineup Member # 3. The criterion-shift parameter of the WITNESS 
model could explain why there might be a decrease in ―not-there‖ responses when the co-
witness identified Lineup Member # 3, but why would this manipulation reduce choices of 
Lineup Member #1? There is nothing in the WITNESS model (or other global matching 
models) that would allow the match parameter to accommodate this finding either, because 
the match parameter is, in effect, a judgment of perceptual similarity between the witness‘s 
memory and the lineup member. . It is clear that the WITNESS model and other two-
parameter recognition models must be reworked in order to include a third, social influence 
variable. 
The phenomenon of an eyewitness identifying a clearly implausible lineup member 
appears similar to what is observed in some of the proven cases of mistaken identification. 
James Newsome was identified by three separate eyewitnesses as the perpetrator of an armed 
robber crime. However, if the eyewitnesses had been using the decision-making process 
described in the WITNESS model, there would be only a 1 in 37,037 chance that all three 
eyewitnesses would have identified him as resembling the perpetrator. Although the 
WITNESS model may be able to predict whether or not eyewitnesses will attempt an 
identification, the model is unable to account for eyewitnesses who do not identify the lineup 
member that best matches their memory of the perpetrator. Obviously, in cases such as 
Newsome‘s, there is a third parameter playing a role in the decision-making process that is 
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missing from the WITNESS model. According to the testimony of the lone surviving witness 
in the Newsome case, who testified at the civil suit after the exoneration of Newsome, he did 
not think anyone in the lineup was the murderer but the Chicago Police Detectives told him 
that he must choose number two in the lineup (Newsome) and he complied with that demand.  
The Newsome case appears to be an example of one kind of social influence, namely 
compliance or obedience to authority. In the case of Experiment 1, however, obedience to 
authority is not the type of social influence that is involved (the co-witness is not an authority 
figure or someone who has power over the participant). Instead, the observed effect in 
Experiment 1 appears to be what is typically called conformity. Conformity can be due to 
normative influences or informational influences. Normative influence—in which a person 
conforms in order to be accepted by the group—does not appear to play a role in this 
experiment because participants made their identification decisions while in cubicles by 
themselves, they were led to believe that their co-witness had already been run in the 
experiment, and there was no reason for them to believe that they would encounter their co-
witness in the future. Therefore, information influence—in which a person conforms because 
he or she believes the influencer is correct—is the more descriptive of the type of conformity 
occurring in this paradigm.  
The extent to which the eyewitnesses internalized their identifications is indicative of 
whether normative or information influence played a role in the participants‘ conformity to 
the co-witness‘s identification decisions. Internalization can be examined by looking at the 
confidence they expressed in their identification decision. Eyewitnesses who made the same 
identification decision as their co-witness expressed higher confidence in that identification 
than did eyewitness who made a different identification decision than their co-witness. 
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Additionally, of the participants who made the same identification as their co-witness, those 
who said the perpetrator was not in the lineup and those who said the perpetrator was a 
plausible lineup member had higher confidence in their identifications than those who said 
the perpetrator was an implausible lineup member. Participants who identified the 
implausible lineup member after learning that their co-witness identified that lineup member 
were 64% confident in that decision, which was similar to the average confidence (67%) 
people in the control condition expressed in their identification decisions of the plausible 
lineup members. Because no participant in the control condition identified the implausible 
lineup member, it can be assumed that the confidence that they would have had that the 
implausible lineup member was the perpetrator would be much lower than that the average 
confidence level. This is because participants who made identification decisions based on 
similarity alone made the decision in which they had the most confidence. If the implausible 
lineup member was never identified by people in this group, then they were all more 
confident that the perpetrator was either not in the lineup or was another lineup member, than 
they were that the implausible lineup member was the perpetrator. 
In general, everyone seemed to look to the co-witness somewhat for cues on how to 
respond to the questions about their identifications and their confidence in their 
identifications. This is evidenced by the way in which, regardless of the identification 
decision the co-witness made or whether or not people made the same decision as the co-
witness, those that learned that their co-witness expressed high confidence in his or her 
decision had higher confidence in their own decision than those who learned that their co-
witness expressed low confidence in his or her decision. However, this confidence-matching 
activity appears to be the only influence that the co-witness‘s confidence in his or her 
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identification decision had on participants‘ identification decisions and confidence in those 
decisions. 
It was somewhat surprising that the implausible co-witness information led to a 
significant increase in choices of the implausible lineup member, and this was equally true 
regardless of the confidence of the co-witness. This suggests that the participants probably 
had quite weak memories for the perpetrator. More will be said about this in the final 
discussion section, but the fact that a 55% confident co-witness can have as much effect as a 
98% confidence co-witness, even to the point of leading a significant proportion of 
participants to select an implausible lineup member, is not something that would be expected 
from participants who have a reasonable independent recollection of the perpetrator. The fact 
that a majority of the participants in the control condition made a positive identification even 
though the actual perpetrator was not in the lineup (and yet were warned that he might not be 
present) also suggests a very weak memory for the perpetrator. At the same time, memory for 
the perpetrator was good enough in the control condition for participants to avoid selecting 
the implausible lineup member. Because the confidence of the co-witness had no influence in 
Experiment 1, co-witness confidence was not manipulated in Experiment 2.  
Would these findings be different if the eyewitnesses were asked to think about the 
identification decision they would make before ever receiving the co-witness information? It 
is possible that the eyewitnesses follow their co-witnesses‘ identification decisions because 
they have not yet made an identification on their own. Therefore, once they view the lineup, 
they only look to confirm the identification hypothesis provided by the co-witness. 
Experiment 2 examined this potential memorial trace moderator of co-witness conformity. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
INTRODUCTION 
In Experiment 1 the participant-witnesses were given information about their co-
witness‘s identification decision before the participants ever viewed the lineup. Experiment 2 
examined whether or not the order in which participants accessed their memorial information 
and received extra-memorial information would moderate the co-witness conformity effect. 
Due to the anchoring and adjustment phenomenon (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley & 
Gilovich, 2006; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the order in 
which people encounter information that is self-generated or other-generated (i.e., whether 
the first piece information is memorial or extra-memorial) is hypothesized to moderate the 
co-witness conformity effect. 
Prophylactics of Social Influence on Memory 
It has been found that having people recall an image on their own before 
collaborating with a co-participant nearly eliminates the confidence bolstering that results 
from collaborative recall (Stephenson & Wagner, 1989). Additionally, research on the post-
identification feedback effect has shown that if people who make an identification merely 
think about how confident they are in their decision and how they would answer other 
testimony-relevant variables before receiving confirming feedback, then the effect of the 
feedback on their subsequent answers to testimony-relevant questions is nearly eliminated 
(Wells & Bradfield, 1999). Simply thinking about how they would respond, without actually 
responding yet to the questions, acts as a prophylactic against the influence of the feedback. 
It is hypothesized that this occurs because people are unaware of how they would respond to 
the testimony-relevant questions until they are actually asked to consider them. Thinking 
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about how they would respond to the questions, without explicitly answering them, allows 
the eyewitnesses to anchor their subsequent responses on their true answers to these 
questions. Therefore, when given the influencing information about the accuracy of their 
identification, there is little to no inflation of eyewitnesses‘ estimates of their views on 
testimony-relevant questions. 
Anchoring and Adjustment 
In general, people make estimates by starting at an initial value and adjusting from 
that value to arrive at the final answer. However, the adjustments tend to be insufficient, 
thereby producing a final answer that is biased towards the initial value. Consequently, the 
initial value has been termed an anchor (Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 
2006; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) because it restricts the 
extent to which a person will make adjustments from that anchor based on new information 
or further thought. The starting point can either be provided to or generated by the person 
who ultimately must provide an estimated answer.  
Classic work done by Tversky and Kahneman on the anchoring and adjustment 
phenomenon has included both arbitrary, other-generated and non-arbitrary, self-generated 
anchors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In one study, participants were asked provide an 
estimate in terms of percentages. Before providing the estimate, participants spun a wheel 
that was numbered from 0 to 100. They then had to state whether the final answer was higher 
or lower than the number on the wheel. The number on the wheel provided a clearly arbitrary 
other-generated anchor for the participants, and their final estimates tended to be somewhat 
biased towards this anchor.  
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In another study, participants were asked to provide an estimated answer to a 
numerical expression that was written on a blackboard, but they were not given enough time 
to fully solve the problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). One half of the participants were 
asked to estimate the answer to 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 and the other half were asked to 
estimate the answer to 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1. The median estimate for the ascending 
computation was 512, but the median estimate for the descending computation was 2,250. 
The correct answer is 40,320. For these problems, participants created their own, non-
arbitrary anchors by making a sort of incomplete computation by computing the answer for 
the first few terms in the equation before giving their estimated answer to the problem. The 
participants who viewed the descending computation had a higher overall estimate for the 
answer to the problem because they began by multiplying 8, 7, and 6 whereas participants 
who viewed the ascending computation began by multiplying 1, 2, and 3. 
Part of the reason for insufficient adjustment from an anchor is that the existence of 
an anchor, especially a self-generated, non-arbitrary anchor, results in increased accessibility 
of anchor-consistent information (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 1999; 2000; 2001b). Because of 
peoples‘ tendencies to confirm their original hypotheses (e.g., Bressan & Dal Martello, 2002; 
Darley & Gross, 1983; Kelley, 1950), the resulting estimation or judgment tends to be 
disproportionately consistent with the anchor. Additionally, adjustments tend to be 
insufficient because people stop adjusting as soon as they reach the end of some implicit 
range of plausible values (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001a); thereby 
adjustment stops toward the anchor side of a range of plausible values. 
Anchors have to be considered plausible estimates before they can serve as an anchor 
(Epley & Gilovich, 2001). Self-generated anchors will typically be considered plausible, 
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although other-generated anchors might not. The reason is that some other-generated 
anchors, such as a number generated by spinning a wheel, may appear arbitrary, whereas 
self-generated anchors, such as one that is reached by making a partial computation to a 
problem, are automatically non-arbitrary or meaningful. In the case of a co-witness whose 
identification decision serves as an other-generated anchor, this decision should not be 
considered arbitrary. This is because participants will not assume that their co-witness is 
spinning a wheel in order to reach his or her decision but rather that the decision reflects the 
co-witness‘s beliefs. Therefore, this other-generated anchor will continue to have anchoring 
characteristics on the participant-witnesses‘ identification decisions. 
Additionally, the processes by which people evaluate and adjust from other-generated 
and self-generated anchors appear to be quite different, resulting in self-generated anchors 
being much more powerful than other-generated anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). 
Responses to estimates that are given following other-generated anchors tend to fall towards 
the center of the range of plausible values for an estimate—those within a latitude of 
acceptance—rather than be very biased towards the anchors. Adjustments from self-
generated anchors, however, tend to be insufficient because people stop the adjustment 
process once a plausible value is reached, but if they are willing and able to search for a more 
accurate estimate, then they will continue to adjust from the initial self-generated anchor.  
In Experiment 1, the identification decision that the co-witness made was provided to 
the participants before they had a chance to view the lineup themselves. In Experiment 2, 
some participants were given information about the co-witness‘s identification only after 
they viewed the lineup themselves. Because my interest is in the differential negotiation 
process utilized by the participant-witnesses who view the lineup first or receive co-witness 
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information first, I only utilized the most powerful co-witnesses—those who make plausible 
identification decisions with high confidence. This experiment was a 2(Order: lineup first, 
co-witness information first) x 2(Identification decision: plausible, correct rejection) 
between-subjects design with an additional control condition in which participants were not 
given any information about the co-witness‘s identification. 
If, as hypothesized, the order in which participants received information about their 
co-witness‘s identification decision and view the lineup moderates the co-witness conformity 
effect, then this would provide information about the process by which people negotiate 
memorial and extra-memorial information. If people really are using the discrepancy between 
the memorial information and extra-memorial information that they have when making a 
recognition decision, then the order in which they receive, or access, those two sets 
information should define which of these pieces of information the anchor is. 
Counterfactual Assessments of Influence 
One aspect of the identification process that may be presented to triers of fact is the 
extent to which an eyewitness believes that he or she has been influenced by a prejudicial 
variable. This is often assessed during a pre-trial hearing in which the admissibility of the 
eyewitness identification is discussed. Typically during such a hearing, an eyewitness is 
asked whether or not a prejudicial variable had any influence on him or her, and the majority 
of the time the eyewitness will say that it did not. Recently, a counterfactual paradigm has 
been developed to find out if people can determine the extent to which a variable has 
influenced their identification decision and if they can mentally ―undo‖ the influence of that 
variable (Charman & Wells, 2008). In the counterfactual-estimation paradigm, eyewitnesses 
are asked how they would have responded to particular questions had they not been exposed 
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to a specific contaminating variable. In order to determine how well the eyewitness is able to 
correct for this influence, another group of eyewitnesses is exposed to the exact same 
situation, but without that particular contaminating variable. Then, the counterfactual answer 
that the influenced eyewitnesses provided is compared with the answer that the non-
influenced eyewitnesses provided to the same question. If the influenced eyewitnesses are 
able to undo the contamination, then these two answers should be similar. 
There have only been two studies (one article) conducted so far that have used this 
counterfactual-estimation paradigm (Charman & Wells, 2008), and the authors concluded 
that, at least in regard to lineup instructions and co-witness, post-identification feedback, 
eyewitnesses are able to determine that these contaminating variables had an influence on 
their identification decision. Additionally, the eyewitnesses were able to somewhat correct 
for the influence. However, at times they overcorrected and other times they under-corrected 
for the influence, and these corrections appear to represent guesses, rather than introspective 
access to what the witnesses were thinking before they received the contaminating 
information.  
Congruent with the findings of previous research on counterfactual thinking (Dunning 
& Parpal, 1989), it was found that people are able to see more of an impact from mentally 
adding a form of influence to a situation than they do from mentally subtracting that same 
influence from a situation. Accordingly, underestimation of the influence of a prejudicial 
factor occurs when people attempt to subtract the influence that the factor has had on them. 
All of the counterfactual estimates in this study were subtractions of influence. Based upon 
the findings in the counterfactual literature (Charman & Wells, 2008; Dunning & Parpal), it 
was predicted that participants who receive information about their co-witness identification 
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decision before viewing the lineup themselves will be unable to fully subtract the influence 
of this information. However, participants who view the lineup before receiving information 
about their co-witness‘s identification decision should be able to accurately estimate how 
they would have responded to the identification question had they not been given information 
about their co-witness. This is because participants who view the lineup first should know 
how they would have responded to the lineup had they not received information about the co-
witness‘s identification, and should, therefore, be able to mentally undo any influence that 
the co-witness has on them. 
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METHOD 
Three hundred and sixty participants from a large Midwestern university received 
partial research course credit for their participation in this experiment. Participants in 
Experiment 2 watched the same video and were told of the existence of a co-witness in the 
same way as were participants in Experiment 1. However, after viewing the video-taped 
crime, participants were randomly assigned to a lineup first or co-witness information first 
condition. Participants who were in the lineup first condition viewed the target-absent lineup 
for 15s and were asked to think about the identification decision that at they would make 
when given an opportunity to make a decision. They were then were given information about 
the co-witness‘s identification decision for 15s. Participants who were in the co-witness 
information first condition were given information about the co-witness‘s identification for 
15s, and then they were asked to look at a lineup and think about the identification decision 
they would make when given the opportunity to make a decision for 15s. The co-witness 
information that participants received was either a plausible identification (of which there 
were two) or a ―not there‖ response. In Experiment 2, the lineup members utilized as the 
plausible lineup members were #1 and #3 because these two lineup members had the highest 
identification rates in the control condition in Experiment 1. All participants were told that 
the co-witness‘s identification decision was made with 98% confidence. 
At this point, all participants saw a new screen on which they were asked to indicate 
their identification decision and their confidence in the decision, as were participants in 
Experiment 1. Participants in the experimental conditions were then told that the 
experimenters were also interested in whether or not the information from the co-witness 
influenced their identification decision. Therefore, they were asked to indicate the 
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identification decision they would have made had they not received information about the co-
witness‘s identification decision. They were also asked to indicate the confidence they would 
have made this identification had they not received any information about the co-witness‘s 
identification or confidence in the identification.  
The control condition was designed to determine the base rate for each identification 
decision without co-witness influence and a large number of participants in this condition 
would serve to stabilize this base rate information. Although the 360 previously-mentioned 
participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition or the control condition in 
this experiment, an additional 65 participants were run in the control condition in Experiment 
1. Recall that following a non-significant test of the differences between the control 
conditions in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, that data were collapsed for all subsequent 
analyses in order to increase the stability of the base rate information. (See Figure 3.) 
60 
 
RESULTS 
It was hypothesized that the order in which participants received information about 
their co-witness‘s identification decision and viewed the lineup would moderate the co-
witness conformity effect. Therefore, I compared the rates at which participants made 
different identification decisions across the experimental conditions. I then compared the 
proportion of participants in each experimental condition who made a particular 
identification decision to the proportion of participants in the control condition who made 
that identification decision. It was also hypothesized that participants who saw the lineup first 
would be better able to estimate how they would have performed without the information 
from the co-witness than participants who received the co-witness information first. 
Therefore, I compared participants‘ counterfactual estimates of the identification decision 
they would have made had they not been given information about the co-witness‘s decision 
to the proportion of participants in the control condition who made that decision and to the 
proportion of participants in the experimental condition who made that decision. 
 Of the 425 participants, 37 were excluded from analysis because they had taken a 
class in which eyewitness variables were discussed or had seen the ―crime‖ video and lineup 
at some point before participating in the experiment. Therefore, data analyses are based on 
388 participants from a large Midwestern university who received partial research course 
credit for their participation in this experiment. 
Actual Identification Response Data 
Overall Identification Rate Change in Experimental Conditions 
 Did the manipulated variables affect the distribution of identification responses across 
the seven choice possibilities? A three-way hierarchical loglinear analysis by backward 
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elimination was carried out to determine associations between co-witness choice (three 
categories: not there, plausible #1, plausible #2) and information order (two levels: lineup 
first, co-witness information first) on witness choices (seven categories: identify 1, 2,…6. or 
―not there‖). The interaction between co-witness choice and information order was not 
significant, Χ2(12, N = 259) = 7.82, p = .80. However there were significant combined main 
effects for co-witness choice and information order, Χ2(20, N = 3259) = 44.71, p = .001. The 
generating class of the final model only includes the main effect of co-witness decision on 
participants‘ identification choices. Because information order was not a significant 
moderating variable of the participants‘ identification decisions, subsequent analyses of 
identification rates were collapsed across information order. 
Overall Identification Rate Change in Experimental Conditions 
            Although the co-witness‘s identification appears to have had an effect on the 
participants‘ identification decisions, differences across these decisions might merely be a 
result of different base rates for each of the possible identification decisions. As can be seen 
in Figure 3, control rates for the critical identification decisions (Not there, Lineup Member 
#1, and Lineup Member #3), ranged from 15.5% to 37.2%. Therefore, subsequent analyses 
are composed of contrasts using z-tests of proportions on differences (changes) in 
proportions between the control condition and the experimental conditions. 
Identification Rate Change From Control Across Conditions 
 Participants who were told that their co-witness said the perpetrator was not in the 
lineup had an increased rate at which they also said that the perpetrator was not present in the 
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lineup from those in the control condition by 18.9%, z = 3.055, p = .002. (See Table 2.)
2
 
When participants learned that their co-witness identified Lineup Member #1, a plausible 
lineup member, they were more likely to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime than 
were participants in the control condition, z = 2.076, p = .038. However, participants who 
learned that their co-witness identified Lineup Member #3, a different plausible lineup 
member, did not identify Lineup member #3 at a rate significantly different from the control 
condition, z = .333, p = .740. 
 Change From control in identification rates across conditions. Did the co-witness 
conditions (i.e., not there, plausible, or implausible) have differential magnitudes of impact 
on the participants‘ identification decisions? In order to answer this question, a comparison 
was made across conditions of z-scores that represent the amount of change in proportions 
between the control condition and the experimental conditions. Participants who were told 
that the co-witness said the perpetrator was not present in the lineup, had a greater increase 
from control in the proportion of participants who made that identification than did 
participants who were told that the co-witness said the perpetrator was  Lineup Member #3, a 
plausible identification, z = 2.722, p = .007. The increase from control in the proportion of 
participants who identified Lineup Member #1 after learning that the co-witness identified 
Lineup Member #1 was not significantly different, however, from the increase from control 
in the proportion of participants who made the same identification as the co-witness after 
learning that the co-witness said that the perpetrator was ―not there‖ and participants who  
                                                             
2 A table with percent increases from the control condition in participants giving the same responses as the co-
witness separated by the order in which participants viewed the lineup and received the co-witness information 
can be found in Appendix B. 
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Table 2. Increases from control condition in the proportion of participants giving the same 
responses as the co-witness. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
       % change                
Condition    from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Co-witness says ―not there‖        .189              3.055           .003            (.070, .309) 
Co-witness says #1 (plausible)        .126              2.076           .038            (-.001, .253)
3
 
Co-witness says #3 (plausible)        .021              0.333           .740            (-.106, .148) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                             
3 Because the z-test assumes that the null hypothesis is true and the 95% CI does not assume that the null 
hypothesis is true, this CI includes 0 even though the z-score indicates that the difference is significant at the 
.038 level. 
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were told that the co-witness said the perpetrator was Lineup Member #1, a plausible 
identification, z = .979, p = .328 and z = 1.743, p = .081, respectively. 
Identification rate change from control for the potentially-influenced participants. A 
report of the 21.8% average increase from control in participants saying that the perpetrator 
was not in the lineup after hearing that the co-witness had done so underestimates the extent 
to which participants were influenced by the co-witness information. Because in the control 
condition 37.2% of the participants said that the perpetrator was not in the lineup, only 62.8% 
of the participants who were told that the co-witness said the perpetrator was ―not there‖ had 
the potential to be influenced by the co-witness information. Of these participants that had 
the opportunity to be influenced, an estimated 33.8% (21.8% of 62.8%) decided to say that 
the perpetrator was not present in the lineup even though they would not have made that 
decision without information from the co-witness. 
A similar result occurs when identifications of Lineup Member #1, a plausible lineup 
member, are examined. In the control condition, Lineup Member #1 was identified by 15.5% 
of the participants, leaving only 84.5% of participants who received information that the co-
witness identified Lineup Member #1 to have the potential to be influenced. Therefore, the 
identification rate increase of 17.2% of Lineup Member #1 for participants who learned that 
their co-witness identified Lineup Member #1 underestimates the influence of the co-witness. 
Of those who could have been affected by the co-witness information about Lineup Member 
#1, approximately 20.4% (17.2% of the 84.5%) were. 
Lineup Member #3, a plausible lineup member, was identified 22.5% of the time in 
the control condition, which leaves 77.5% of the participants who learned that Lineup 
Member #3 was identified by the co-witness to have the possibility of being influenced. 
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However, the rate at which participants identified Lineup Member #3 increased by 2.1% 
when participants were told that their co-witness identified Lineup Member #3. Therefore, 
the participants that had the opportunity to be influenced, an estimated 2.7% (2.1% of 77.5%) 
decided to say that the perpetrator was Lineup Member #3 even though they would not have 
made that decision without information from the co-witness. 
Identification rate change for other identification decisions across conditions. 
Because responses across the seven possible response categories must total 100%, an 
increase in rates of identification that are in agreement with the co-witness must be 
accompanied by an equal decrease in the sum of the other six possible responses. Hence, for 
each analysis of increases in agreement with the co-witness, I also examined decreases in 
responses for the other six possible responses (again, decreases relative to the control). 
Figure 10 displays the change in identification rates from the control group for each of the 
identification decisions when the participant is told that the co-witness says that the 
perpetrator was not present in the lineup. There was a significant increase in the percentage 
of participants saying that the perpetrator was ―not there‖ for participants who were told that 
the co-witness said that the perpetrator was not in the lineup. However, this was not 
accompanied by a significant decrease from the control identification rate in the proportion 
of participants who made any other identification decision. 
 As can be seen in Figure 11, the 17.2% increase in identifications of Lineup Member 
#1 for participants who learned about a co-witness who identified Lineup Member #1 was 
not accompanied by a significant decrease in any other identification decision.  
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Figure 10. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was not present in the lineup. 
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Figure 11. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #1. 
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Figure 12. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #3. 
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Participants who were told that their co-witness identified Lineup Member #3, a 
plausible identification, did not show a significant increase from control in the rate of 
identifications of Lineup Member #3. Accordingly, there was also not a significant decrease 
in any of the other identification choices from the control identification rates. (See Figure 
12.)  
Identification Confidence Response Data 
 Would participants‘ confidence in their identification decisions be influenced by a) 
whether they learned about a co-witness who said the perpetrator was not in the lineup or that 
the perpetrator was a plausible lineup member, b) whether they viewed the lineup first or the 
co-witness information first, or c) whether they made the same decision as the co-witness or 
a different decision than the co-witness? Only one of the three above-mentioned factors 
significantly influenced the confidence participants expressed in their identification 
decisions. Participants who made the same identification decision as their co-witness had 
higher confidence in that decision (M = 84.98) than participants who made a different 
decision than their co-witness (M = 71.81), F(1,251) = 26.00, p < .001, Cohen‘s f = .32. No 
other factors either alone or in combination with others significantly influenced the 
participants‘ confidence in their identification decisions so they are not reported here. 
After making their identification decisions and answering the confidence question, 
participants in the co-witness conditions (but not in the control condition) were asked to 
make their identification decision and state their confidence again under the (counterfactual) 
assumption that they had not learned of the decision of the co-witness prior to making their 
identification. Almost three quarters (74.5%) of participants gave the same counterfactual 
identification decision as their actual identification decision. A 2(Confidence in 
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identification: actual, counterfactual) x 2(Co-witness identification: not there, plausible) x 
2(View first: lineup, co-witness information) x 2(Decision: same as co-witness, different than 
co-witness) ANOVA, with confidence in the identification as a repeated measure was 
performed for participants who made the same actual and counterfactual identification 
decisions. Participants who gave different actual and counterfactual identification decisions 
were excluded from this analysis because it was unclear which identification decision (actual 
or counterfactual) this sub-group was rating.  
The identification decision that the co-witness made (not there, plausible #1, or 
plausible #2) and the order in which the participants saw the lineup and saw the co-witness 
information did not significantly influence how confident participants were in their 
identification decisions, F(1, 243) = 2.103, p = .15, Cohen‘s f = .09 and F(1, 243) = .216, p = 
.64, Cohen‘s f = .03, respectively. However, participants who made the same identification 
decision as their co-witness expressed more confidence in that identification than participants 
who made a different decision than their co-witness, F(1, 243) = 9.18, p = .003, Cohen‘s f = 
.19. (See Figure 13.) Additionally, participants‘ counterfactual estimations of their 
confidence in their identification were lower than were participants‘ actual confidence levels, 
F(1, 243) = 6.62, p = .01, Cohen‘s f = .17. Because there were no significant differences in 
the results when the plausible identification choices were combined or separated, they have 
been combined for the purposes of subsequent analyses. 
Among the four variables of interest (actual v. counterfactual, co-witness 
identification, information order, same v. different identification) there was only one 
significant interaction. That interaction was between participants‘ confidence (actual v. 
counterfactual) and whether or not participants made the same identification decision as their 
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co-witness, F(1,185) = 26.88, p < .001, Cohen‘s f = .38. On one hand, participants who made 
the same identification decision as their co-witness thought they would have been less 
confident in their decision had they not received information from their co-witness, t(64) = 
4.80, p < .001, d = .85. On the other hand, participants who made a different identification 
decision than their co-witness thought they would have been more confident in their decision 
had they not received information from their co-witness, t(127) = 2.15, p = .03, d = .27. 
Counterfactual Identification Response Data 
After making their identification decisions and answering the confidence question, 
participants in the co-witness conditions were asked to make their identification decision and 
state their confidence again under the (counterfactual) assumption that they had not learned 
of the decision of the co-witness prior to making their identification. Based on the logic 
articulated by Charman and Wells (2008), if the participants were able to mentally subtract 
the influence fully, then their new counterfactual choices ought to closely resemble the 
choice patterns of the control (no co-witness) conditions.  
The majority of the participants (74.5%) gave the same counterfactual response as 
their original response. This was especially true for participants who gave an original 
response that was different than the co-witness. Among participants who originally gave a 
different identification decision than the co-witness, 84.2% gave the same counterfactual 
response as their original response whereas 60.4% of those who originally gave the same 
response as the co-witness gave the same counterfactual and original response, Χ2(1, N = 
259) = 11.21, p < .001. This makes sense because those who gave a different response than 
the co-witness did so despite the opinion of the co-witness, so they surely would have made 
that same response if they had not learned of the co-witness‘s response. Hence, the dilemma  
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Figure 13. Participants‘ actual and counterfactual confidence in their identification decision 
as a function of making the same or different identification decision as their co-witness. 
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for participants (as to whether they think that they would have responded differently had they 
not received the co-witness information) is restricted almost exclusively to those who gave a 
response that matched the co-witness information. And, many of those participants would 
have given the same response had they not received the co-witness information. Hence, the 
metric for assessing whether participants could mentally remove the co-witness influence 
requires a comparison of their counterfactual responses to the responses of those in the 
control condition. 
Figure 14 displays the proportion of control condition participants who said the 
perpetrator was not in the lineup; identified Lineup Member #1, a plausible identification 
decision; or identified Lineup Member #3, the other plausible identification decision. 
Additionally, Figure 14 includes the proportion of participants who made the same 
identification decision when the co-witness made that decision (labeled ―actual‖), and the 
proportion of participants who continued to indicate (under the counterfactual assumption) 
that they would have made that same identification decision (labeled ―counterfactual‖). 
These proportions are reported separately for participants who viewed the lineup first (before 
co-witness information) and those who received co-witness information first (before viewing 
the lineup). In both the plausible #1 condition and the ―not-there‖ condition, participants‘ 
counterfactual estimates are somewhat lower than their actual rates of identification 
(indicating some correction for the co-witness information) but neither fully return to the 
level of the control condition (indicating under-correction). Plausible # 2 indicates a different 
pattern, one that suggests over-correction. But, there was not a significant co-witness 
information effect for the plausible # 2 condition in the first place, so it is unclear what is 
happening in this condition. 
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Figure 14. Proportion of participants who made each identification decision after receiving 
information about the co-witness‘s plausible or ―not there‖ identification decision either 
before or after viewing the lineup, and proportion of participants who think they would have 
made each identification decision had they not received information about the co-witness‘s 
decision, compared with control identification rates. 
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In order to determine whether the counterfactual responses showed complete 
correction for the co-witness information, a difference score was calculated between 
participants‘ counterfactual estimates and the control condition for each of the three co-
witness conditions as a function of whether participants viewed the lineup first or received 
the co-witness information first. The prediction was that these counterfactual estimate scores 
would be lower (closer to full correction) when participants viewed the lineup first than when 
participants received the co-witness information first. Table 3 displays the difference scores 
between participants‘ counterfactual answers and the control condition along with tests of the 
differences in proportions. A lower number indicates a closer approximation to the control 
condition. 
 As indicated in Table 3, only one of the contrasts indicated that participants‘ 
counterfactual estimates remained significantly higher than the control condition. Contrary to 
the hypothesis, this significant failure to fully correct for the co-witness information occurred 
in a lineup-first condition. In fact, except for the Plausible # 2 co-witness information 
conditions, correction appeared to be more complete for the lineup-first conditions than for 
the co-witness first conditions.  
 Despite the fact that counterfactual estimates significantly differed from control 
conditions for only one of the six relevant contrasts, it is also apparent from Figure 14 that 
counterfactual estimates also remained fairly close to the actual scores in the co-witness 
conditions. In order to determine whether the counterfactual responses showed significant 
correction from actual responses, a difference score was calculated between participants‘ 
counterfactual estimates and their actual responses for each of the three co-witness conditions 
as a function of whether participants viewed the lineup first or received the co-witness  
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Table 3. Difference from control condition in the proportion of participants who would make 
each identification decision when participants counterfactually estimate their identification 
decisions. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
               % difference  
               
Condition    from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Co-witness says ―not there‖ 
Lineup First         .098              1.314           .189           (-.049, .244) 
Co-witness Info First        .003                .039           .969           (-.142, .148) 
Co-witness says #1 (plausible) 
Lineup First         .126              1.663           .096           (-.042, .294) 
Co-witness Info First        .032                .447           .655           (-.117, .181) 
Co-witness says #3 (plausible) 
Lineup First        -.063               -.851          .395           (-.214, .076) 
Co-witness Info First        .018                .215           .829           (-.145, .181) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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information first. Negative scores indicate greater amounts of correction in the proper 
direction. As can be seen in Table 4, regardless of who they were told the co-witness 
identified and the order in which they received this information and viewed the lineup, 
participants did not significantly estimate that they would have made any different 
identification decisions than they actually did. On average, participants did (non-
significantly) correct in the proper direction, which is toward the control condition (again, 
with the exception of the Plausible #2 condition). However, the pattern does not indicate any 
support for the hypothesis that participants who viewed the lineup first were better able to 
correct for the co-witness influence than were those who received the co-witness information 
first. 
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Table 4. Difference from experimental condition in the proportion of participants who would 
make each identification decision when participants counterfactually estimate their 
identification decisions. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
               % difference  
               
Condition    from actual      z-score       p-value            95% CI 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Co-witness says ―not there‖ 
Lineup First      -.121              1.395          .163           (-.290, .048) 
Co-witness Info First     -.156              1.776          .076           (-.327, .014) 
Co-witness says #1 (plausible) 
Lineup First      -.031                .274          .784           (-.255, .192) 
Co-witness Info First     -.062                .605          .545           (-.265, .139) 
Co-witness says #3 (plausible) 
Lineup First      -.063                .641          .522           (-.253, .128) 
Co-witness Info First     -.030                .281          .778           (-.241, .181) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 2 generally mirrored those of Experiment 1. It was 
hypothesized, however, that having the participants view the lineup before they received the 
co-witness information would moderate the effect of the co-witness information. This 
prediction was based largely on the notion of anchoring and adjustment. However, if 
anything, the opposite of this effect occurred. Participants tended to be influenced more when 
they viewed the lineup first than when they received the co-witness information first.  
Why did having participants view the lineup on their own first not lead to the 
hypothesized prophylactic effect? It is possible that by letting the witnesses see the lineup 
without co-witness information, they realized how difficult it is to make an identification 
decision from a lineup. In fact, when people view a target absent lineup, as opposed to a 
target present lineup, they say that they did not have as good of a view of the crime, were not 
paying as much attention to the crime, and overall report having a worse memory for the 
perpetrator (Bradfield & Wells, 1998). Hence, having witnesses view the lineup before 
learning the co-witness information might have merely made them lose confidence in their 
ability to make an accurate decision. In other words, viewing the lineup first might have 
actually promoted their uncertainty and made them more receptive to external influence. 
Alternatively, or in addition, all witnesses in this experiment knew before ever viewing the 
lineup that they would receive information about their co-witness‘s identification before 
having to make an identification decision. Therefore, the participants may have waited to 
receive information about the co-witness‘s decision before making a decision of their own. 
Witnesses who received the co-witness information first, in contrast, knew who their co-
witness identified when they viewed the lineup for the first time, and they merely had the 
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task of checking to see whether or not they agreed with the co-witness. Therefore, people 
who received information about the co-witness‘s identification first were not as readily 
influenced by the co-witness‘s identification as were witnesses who did not get information 
about their co-witness‘s identification until after viewing the lineup. These are speculative 
interpretations and, it should be remembered that the order effect was not statistically 
significant, but the direction of the means suggests that the failure to obtain the prophylactic 
effect was not due to lack of power.  
The counterfactual results showed that participants gave counterfactual responses that 
were not significantly different from their original response in any condition. Although the 
direction of this non-significant change was always correct (moving toward the control 
condition), counterfactual estimates clearly did not show full correction. Furthermore, this 
ability to partially correct for the influence of a co-witness was not better for participants 
who viewed the lineup first than it was for participants who viewed the co-witness 
information first. The prediction was that the lineup-first participants should be better able to 
perform the counterfactual task because they should have had some memory trace for their 
lineup decision preference prior to having received the co-witness information. This failure 
to find an effect for the order manipulation on the counterfactual correction scores is 
consistent, perhaps, with the above-mentioned idea that participants who viewed the lineup 
first did not form clear impression of how they would have responded on their own (even 
though they were given the opportunity to learn this by viewing the lineup alone first).  
In the counterfactual estimation paradigm laid out by Charman and Wells (2008), 
there is a distinction between two types of counterfactual directions. In one type, people are 
exposed to an influential factor and asked to try to imagine how they would have responded 
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had they not received that factor, thereby mentally subtracting that factor. In another type, 
people are not exposed to an influential factor and asked to imagine how they would have 
responded had they received that factor, thereby mentally adding that factor. Charman and 
Wells showed that people are better at adding an influence than they are at subtracting an 
influence, which has been termed asymmetric counterfactual correction. Past research has 
shown that people are partially able to correct for post-identification feedback and biased 
pre-lineup instructions. However, the extent of the counterfactual correction depends on 
whether they are adding or subtracting these influences. Subtraction is always less complete 
than addition.  
In the current research, participants were always asked to subtract an influence, and 
consistent with the asymmetric counterfactual correction, they were unable to completely 
subtract for the influence of the co-witness information
4
. The counterfactual estimations of 
identification behavior without co-witness information always moved in the direction of the 
control group, but there were not any significant decreases from the actual identification 
behavior.
5
 However, there was only one condition—when the participant viewed the lineup 
and then was told that the co-witness identified Lineup Member #1, a plausible choice—in 
which participants‘ counterfactual estimates differed from the control identification rates. 
Therefore, although participants did not seem to be able to fully subtract the influence of the 
                                                             
4 Consideration was given to including addition conditions in the counterfactual estimates. Addition conditions 
would have meant asking the control (no influence) participants to estimate how they would have responded 
had they received co-witness information. However, there were multiple co-witness conditions and this would 
have required multiple additional control conditions for proper comparison. 
5 Information about a co-witness‘s identification of Lineup Member #3, the second plausible lineup member, 
did not have an effect on identification rates of Lineup Member #3. Participants were apparently not influenced 
by this information and, therefore, it would be unreasonable to see if they could subtract the influence of this 
co-witness information. 
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co-witness information, they were able to somewhat correct for this influence to an extent 
that was almost equivalent control group. 
There are two interpretations of the asymmetric counterfactual correction that appear 
in the counterfactual thinking literature (Dunning & Parpal, 1989). The first is that people 
can more easily mentally simulate an influence that has not happened than they can imagine 
not having received an influence. The second is based in hindsight bias and is that people 
cannot imagine themselves without information once they have it (Mynatt et al., 1977; 
Nickerson, 1998; Wason, 1960). For example, when people receive a pre-lineup instruction 
that the perpetrator may or may not be present in a lineup, this idea seems obvious to them 
(Charman & Wells, 2008). Subsequently, they have the illusion that they would have thought 
of the possibility that the perpetrator may or may not have been present in the lineup 
regardless of whether or not they had received that instruction. However, when people who 
never received this instruction are asked to estimate how they would have responded to the 
lineup had they been given this instruction, they realize that this instruction is not intuitive 
and are better able to guess the influence the instruction would have had on them. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Eyewitnesses rely on both memorial and extra-memorial information when making 
recognition judgments. The extra-memorial information not only influences whether or not 
eyewitnesses will make a positive identification, but also whether or not they will identify the 
person in the lineup who is the best-match to their memory of the perpetrator. This finding 
runs counter to the two-parameter models of recognition, such as the WITNESS model, that 
include only signal strength and decision criterion as determinates of what recognition 
decision a person will make (Clark, 2003, 2005). According to the WITNESS model, people 
who decide to make a positive identification from a lineup will identify the best-match lineup 
member. However, in Experiment 1, witnesses‘ identification decisions were not only 
influenced by co-witnesses who made plausible identification decisions but also by co-
witnesses who made very implausible identification decisions. When told that a co-witness 
identified a very implausible lineup member, 15% of the participants in Experiment 1 chose 
to identify this lineup member with reasonably high certainty in their identifications even 
though no participants made that identification on their own (i.e., in the control condition). 
This cannot be explained by criterion shift because criterion shift should merely shift 
eyewitnesses from ―not there‖ to one of the plausible lineup members. Additionally, in 
Experiment 1 the shift from Lineup Member #1, the person identified most in the control 
condition, to Lineup Member #3, one of the plausible lineup members that was identified by 
a co-witness, is not explainable by two-parameter models.  
In many ways, no one will be shocked to learn that these critical conformity effects 
(the two mentioned above) occur. But, to date, no one has shown such effects and noted that 
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the WITNESS model and other models of its type cannot accommodate such findings. 
Because the WITNESS model is a computational model, instead of a processing theory, it 
probably would not be difficult to simply add a third parameter. How one describes that 
parameter (e.g., what it is called), however, is not exactly clear at this point. The term co-
witness influence is too specific because that represents only the particular operationalization 
that was used here. Other situations, such as the one experienced by witnesses in the 
Newsome case, were forms of social influence that emanated from the detectives, not from a 
co-witness. Clearly, the broader term would be social influence, but is this influence always 
social? What if the lineup members‘ photo stood out because it had a background of a 
different color and the witness reasoned that the same-color background photos must be 
fillers and the different-color background must be the suspect? Is that social influence? 
Perhaps. In any case, if such a manipulation affects preferences among lineup members 
(rather than merely affecting willingness to attempt an identification) and does not change 
match characteristics (similarity to the witness‘s memory), then the two-parameter models 
are insufficient to account for the witness‘s behavior toward the lineup when such variables 
are present.  
Eyewitnesses appear to compartmentalize the way in which co-witness information 
will influence them. Information about a co-witness‘s identification decision influenced 
witness‘s own identification decisions, and information about a co-witness‘s confidence in 
his or her identification influenced a witness‘s confidence in his or her own identification 
decision, regardless of whether the eyewitness made a decision that was the same as or 
different than that of the co-witness. However, eyewitnesses were not always aware of 
whether or not information from a co-witness has influenced them. Therefore, they were not 
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able to fully take into account the co-witness‘s influence on their identification decision and 
correct for that influence with their counterfactual estimations. 
This research only scratches the surface of the conditions under which eyewitnesses 
are affected by extra-memorial, social information. One fruitful avenue of future research 
might be to examine the moderating role of memory strength. The recently-postulated 
competition/corroboration conceptualization of eyewitness identification argues that external 
information typically engages a deliberative process that, when inconsistent with automatic 
recognition-memory processes, produces response competition (Charman & Wells, 2007). 
When memory strength is high, deliberative processes tend to play a lesser role in 
determining the response. In the current experiments, it could be argued that memory 
strength was relatively low. After all, participants were told that the perpetrator might not be 
present in the lineup, and although he was not present in the lineup only 40% in the control 
condition were able to detect his absence, the remaining 60% made an identification of 
someone. If memory strength were higher than it was in these particular experiments, then 
participants would not need to rely on co-witness information when making an identification 
decision.  
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FINAL REMARKS 
 One of the most interesting aspects of many DNA exoneration cases involving 
mistaken identification is that the mistakenly-identified person often does not resemble the 
actual perpetrator of the crime. In fact, alternative people in the original lineup—fillers—
often look more similar to the perpetrator of the crime than they do to the person who was 
accused of the crime. Clearly, these are not cases of coincidental resemblance, a common 
way that people think about mistaken identification, or ―best match‖ (which the WITNESS 
model would use to explain the mistake). Why would this phenomenon occur? It certainly is 
not signal strength or decision criteria. There must be another influence playing a role in the 
identification behavior. The data from the current experiments are consistent with the idea 
that such cases can be explained in terms of social influence.   
Some social influence variables can influence match characteristics and decision 
criteria. For example, in one experiment witnesses viewed a photograph of a clean shaven 
man and received co-witness information that included either a comment about the man in 
the photograph having a mustache or no information about the man‘s facial hair. Nearly 70% 
of the witnesses who received co-witness information that mentioned a mustache later 
identified a person with a mustache in a target absent, 12-person lineup, as opposed to 13% 
of witnesses in the control group (Loftus & Greene, 1980). In this case the social information 
seemingly changed the match characteristics of the witnesses. Additionally, witnesses who 
learn that a co-witness made a positive identification are more likely than witnesses who 
learn that a co-witness rejected the lineup to make an identification (Levett & Driest, 2008). 
In this case, knowledge of co-witness behavior probably changed the decision criteria of 
witnesses when viewing the lineup.  
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Results of the current experiments, however, suggest that social influence variables 
do not have to change either the match parameter or the decision criterion parameter to 
influence identification behaviors. In a case in which a witness learns that his or her co-
witness made an implausible identification decision and the witness then chooses to identify 
that same implausible lineup member, such as occurred in Experiment 1, this cannot be 
explained by social influence on match value or decision criterion. Therefore, despite the fact 
that a third social-influence parameter might be difficult or awkward to attempt to define and 
put into a mathematical model, it is a form of variation that is present in some real-world 
eyewitness identification situations. Any model that attempts to explain eyewitness behavior 
both inside and outside of a laboratory must take this third parameter into account. 
Instead of claiming a necessity of the inclusion of a third parameter, one might argue 
that the system should take strides to jettison social influences in eyewitness identification 
behavior. This could be done by putting guidelines in place for the construction of fair 
lineups and for the lineup to be conducted double blind—where neither the witness nor the 
lineup administrator knows who the suspect in the lineup is. Additionally, investigators can 
keep witnesses separated and ask that the witnesses not speak to one another about the crime. 
In fact, guidelines such as these have already been put into place in a variety of jurisdictions 
across the United States (Wells, 2006). However, guidelines such as these will never be able 
to completely eliminate social influence in eyewitness identification behavior. This is 
because the system can only control witness interaction after the case is being handled by the 
police.  
Imagine viewing an armed robbery in a convenience store with two other customers 
and a store clerk. Once the burglar leaves the scene, certainly witnesses will talk about what 
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happened with the other people present before police arrive. Or imagine having viewed that 
same crime and not speaking to co-witnesses about the crime, but watching the news later 
that night and seeing a picture displayed of the person who has been arrested for the crime. 
Witnesses would still be asked to make an identification from the lineup, but having seen the 
person who was arrested shows the witnesses who the other witnesses think robbed the store.  
Social influence can never be completely extricated from real-world eyewitness 
memory and identification behavior. Although some social influence can be controlled for 
once the crime is being investigated, there is always a possibility of social influence 
occurring outside of the police station, which calls for a reworking of any global matching 
model of recognition decisions in the real world, such as the WITNESS model. Any model 
that claims to model eyewitness identification behavior in the real world must include a 
separate, third parameter that is qualitatively different than signal strength and decision 
criteria. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Increases from Control Condition in the Proportion of Participants Giving the Same 
Responses as the High- or Low-Confident Co-Witness for Experiment 1. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
       % change                
Condition    from control      z-score        p-value           95% CI 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Co-witness says ―not there‖ 
High Confident Co-Witness       .279              3.636         <.001            (.134, .423) 
Low Confident Co-Witness       .222              2.917           .004            (.075, .368) 
Co-witness says #3 (plausible) 
High Confident Co-Witness       .244              2.772           .006            (.057, .431) 
Low Confident Co-Witness       .089              1.093           .274            (-.080, .259) 
Co-witness says #6 (plausible) 
High Confident Co-Witness       .071              1.071           .284            (-.075, .217) 
Low Confident Co-Witness       .066              1.000           .317            (-.077, .208) 
Co-witness says #2 (implausible) 
High Confident Co-Witness       .190              5.120         <.001            (.094, .287) 
Low Confident Co-Witness       .108              3.796         <.001            (.032, .183) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B 
Increases from Control Condition in the Proportion of Participants Giving the Same 
Responses as the Co-Witness When They View the Lineup First or View the Co-Witness 
Information First for Experiment 2. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
       % change                
Condition    from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Co-witness says ―not there‖ 
Lineup First         .219              2.909           .003            (.074, .364) 
Co-witness Info First        .159              2.106           .035            (.011, .307) 
Co-witness says #1 (plausible) 
Lineup First         .157              2.048           .041            (-.015, .330)
6
 
Co-witness Info First        .095              1.269           .205            (-.068, .356) 
Co-witness says #3 (plausible) 
Lineup First       -.006               -.074            .941           (-.166, .154) 
Co-witness Info First        .048                .580           .562            (-.120, .216) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                             
6 Because the z-test assumes that the null hypothesis is true and the 95% CI does not assume that the null 
hypothesis is true, this CI includes 0 even though the z-score indicates that the difference is significant at the 
.041 level. 
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APPENDIX C 
Exact Numbers and Sample Sizes for all Figures Included in the Text 
Figure 3. Proportion of participants in the control condition making each identification 
decision. (n = 129) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Identification Decision 
   #1           #2      #3             #4        #5                #6   Not There 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 .200            .000            .185            .077            .015            .123            .400 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 4. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was not in the lineup. (n = 128) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Identification     % change                
Decision   from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI              
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Lineup Member #1       -.069            -1.701           .089           (-.148, .010)       
Lineup Member #2        .008               1.006          .315           (-.007, .023)         
Lineup Member #3       -.115             -2.479           .013          (-.206, -.025)         
Lineup Member #4       -.085             -2.605           .009          (-.148, -.022)         
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Lineup Member #5        .008                .460           .645           (-.026, .042)         
Lineup Member #6        .009                .215           .830           (-.071, .088)         
―Not There‖         .250              3.999         <.001           (.131, .369)         
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 5. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #3. (n = 67) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Identification     % change                
Decision   from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI              
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Lineup Member #1       -.095             -1.931           .053           (-.180, -.011)       
Lineup Member #2        .015               1.391          .164            (-.141, .044)         
Lineup Member #3        .163               2.413          .016            (.026, .300)         
Lineup Member #4       -.072             -1.644          .100             (-.146, .003)         
Lineup Member #5       -.001                .031           .975             (-.036, .035)         
Lineup Member #6        .078               1.475          .140            (-.032, .187)         
―Not There‖        -.089             -1.239           .215            (-.225, .048)         
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 6. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #6. (n = 63) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Identification     % change                
Decision   from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI              
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Lineup Member #1       -.060            -1.137           .256           (-.156, .036)       
Lineup Member #2        .000                .000           .999           (.000, .000)         
Lineup Member #3        .045                .686           .492          (-.086, .176)         
Lineup Member #4       -.005              -.106            .916          (-.101, .090)         
Lineup Member #5        .016                .740           .459           (-.032, .065)         
Lineup Member #6        .068              1.298           .194           (-.041, .178)         
―Not There‖        -.071                .962           .336           (-.211, .070)         
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 7. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #2. (n = 127) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Identification     % change                
Decision   from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI              
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Lineup Member #1       -.029              -.669           .504           (-.114, .056)       
Lineup Member #2        .148              4.547         <.001           (.087, .210)         
Lineup Member #3       -.067              1.369           .171          (-.163, .029)         
Lineup Member #4       -.014              -.357            .721          (-.090, .062)         
Lineup Member #5      <.001                .016           .987           (-.030, .031)         
Lineup Member #6        .057              1.296           .195           (-.029, .143)         
―Not There‖        -.097              1.649           .099           (-.211, .018)         
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 8. Participants‘ confidence in their identification decisions, regardless of 
identification decision. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
       Co-witness says   
Co-witness confidence   ―not there‖     #3 or #6 (plausibles) #2 (implausible) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Control             66.46 (n = 52)        62.59 (n = 40)            n/a (n = 0)       
Co-witness has high confidence       78.87 (n = 63)        80.91 (n = 65)        73.35 (n = 63) 
Co-witness has low confidence        64.40 (n = 65)        58.78 (n = 65)        61.86 (n = 64) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 9. Participants‘ confidence in their identification decision as a function of making the 
same or different identification decision as a co-witness who made a ―not there,‖ plausible, or 
implausible identification decision. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
       Co-witness says   
Participant identification   ―not there‖     #3 or #6 (plausibles) #2 (implausible) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Same as co-witness            77.03 (n = 79)        73.19 (n = 38)        64.16 (n = 19) 
Different than co-witness           62.69 (n = 49)        68.55 (n = 92)        69.24 (n = 108) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 10. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was not present in the lineup. (n = 128) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Identification     % change                
Decision   from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI              
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Lineup Member #1       -.046             -1.080           .280           (-.128, .037)       
Lineup Member #2        .008               1.006           .315          (-.007, .023)         
Lineup Member #3       -.053             -1.064           .287           (-.150, .044)         
Lineup Member #4       -.069             -2.039           .042           (-.136, -.003)         
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Lineup Member #5        .047              1.948            .051          (<-.001, .094)         
Lineup Member #6       -.069            -2.031            .042           (-.136, -.003)         
―Not There‖         .189              3.055            .002          (.070, .309)         
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 11. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #1. (n = 64) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Identification     % change                
Decision   from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI              
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Lineup Member #1        .126              2.076           .038           (<-.001, .253)       
Lineup Member #2        .016              1.423           .155           (-.015, .046)         
Lineup Member #3       -.037               .597            .551          (-.157, .082)         
Lineup Member #4        .009                .176            .860          (-.089, .107)         
Lineup Member #5       -.016             -1.001           .317           (-.037, .006)         
Lineup Member #6        .040                .780           .436           (-.065, .145)         
―Not There‖         .138            -1. 921           .054           (-.271, .005)         
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 12. Change from control with 95% confidence intervals in the proportion of 
participants who made each identification decision when told that their co-witness said that 
the perpetrator was Lineup Member #3. (n = 65) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Identification     % change                
Decision   from control      z-score       p-value            95% CI              
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Lineup Member #1       -.032              -.598            .550          (-.133, .069)       
Lineup Member #2        .015              1.412           .158           (-.015, .045)         
Lineup Member #3        .021                .333           .740          (-.106, .148)         
Lineup Member #4       -.039              -.851            .395          (-.125, .046)         
Lineup Member #5    <-.001                .006            .995          (-.037, .037)         
Lineup Member #6        .022                .443           .658           (-.078, .123)         
―Not There‖         .028                .378           .756           (-.118, .173)         
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 13. Participants‘ actual and counterfactual confidence in their identification decision 
as a function of making the same or different identification decision as their co-witness. 259 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Participant identification  Actual Confidence Counterfactual Confidence 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Same as co-witness (n = 107)          88.24       85.51 
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Different than co-witness (n = 152)         73.14       75.17    
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 14. Participants‘ confidence in their identification decision as a function of viewing 
the lineup first or receiving co-witness information first with a co-witness who made a ―not 
there,‖ plausible identification decision. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
          Co-witness says   
Information order     ―not there‖     #1 or #3 (plausibles) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Lineup first              82.49 (n = 66)            75.24 (n = 64)                
Co-witness information first             78.27 (n = 64)            89.95 (n = 65)                   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
Figure 15. Proportion of participants who made each identification decision after receiving 
information about the co-witness‘s plausible or ―not there‖ identification decision either 
before or after viewing the lineup, and proportion of participants who think they would have 
made each identification decision had they not received information about the co-witness‘s 
decision, compared with control identification rates. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Condition         Control     Actual       Counterfactual 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Co-witness says ―not there‖ 
Lineup First    .37 (n = 88) .59 (n = 39) .47 (n =31) 
Co-witness Info First   .37 (n = 88) .53 (n = 34) .38 (n = 24) 
Co-witness says #1 (plausible) 
Lineup First    .16 (n = 26) .31 (n = 10) .28 (n = 9) 
Co-witness Info First   .16 (n = 26) .25 (n = 8) .19 (n = 6) 
Co-witness says #3 (plausible) 
Lineup First    .22 (n = 24) .22 (n = 7) .27 (n = 5) 
Co-witness Info First   .22 (n = 24) .27 (n = 9) .24 (n = 8) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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